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The Politics of Lawyer Regulation: The Case of
Malpractice Insurance
LESLIE

C.

LEVIN*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the politics of lawyer regulation and considers why
some states will adopt lawyer regulation that protects the public, when others
will not. It uses the debates over how to regulate uninsured lawyers as a
lens through which to examine the question. Clients often cannot recover damagesfrom uninsured lawyers who commit malpractice, even when those lawyers
cause serious harm. Yet only two states require that lawyers carry malpractice
insurance. This Article uses case studies to examine the ways in which six states
recently have addressedthe issue of uninsured lawyers to understand this regulatory failure. It uses interest group theory and cultural capture to explain why
state supreme courts and legislatures rarely initiate efforts to regulate lawyers
in this context, and why lawyer regulation is so dependent on the organized

bar. The case studies suggest when some state bars will act to regulate lawyers
in this context, and factors that affect whether states will ultimately adopt public-regardinglaws. The Article concludes that if courts and legislatures will not
initiate or support lawyer regulation that is unpopular with the bar, other

means are needed to inject the public's interests into the regulatory process. It
suggests two ways to do so.
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INTRODUCTION

States vary in their willingness to regulate lawyers for the benefit of the public.
In forty-eight states, lawyers are not required to maintain insurance to compensate
victims of lawyer malpractice. Only two states-Idaho and Oregon-impose such
a requirement.' In forty-eight states, non-lawyers are prohibited from giving legal
advice to individuals in personal plight areas, even though many people cannot
afford a lawyer. Only Utah and Washington allow licensed non-lawyers to provide
such advice. 2 Likewise, only two states-New York and New Jersey-impose
1. IDAHO BAR COMM'N R. 302(a)(5) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080 (2)(a)(A) (2018).
2. See UTAH JUDICIAL ADMIN. R. 14-802(c) (2017) (permitting licensed paralegal practitioners to engage in
limited practice in areas including divorce and cohabitant abuse); WASH. ADMIN. & PRACTICE R. 28(F) (2020)
(permitting Limited License Legal Technicians to give advice in defined practice areas). Arizona has also begun a
two-year pilot project that will license a small number of nonlawyer "legal advocates" to provide limited advice
on civil matters arising from domestic violence. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Trainingfor Nonlawyers to Provide
Legal Advice Will Start in Arizona in the Fall, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.abajoumal.com/web/article/
training-for-nonlawyers-to-provide-legal-advice-starts-in-arizona
[https://perma.cc/LL9J-FAZS]. Some other
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discipline on law firms,3 even though a firm's senior lawyers and ethical infrastructure affect lawyer conduct.4 Why do a few states, on some occasions, regulate
the legal profession in ways that protect the public, while most others do not?
This is especially puzzling because the states' highest courts usually claim
some responsibility for lawyer regulation and presumably share similar views of
lawyers' duties and their role in society. They have adopted similar requirements
for bar admission and rules of professional conduct for lawyers. They communicate with one another about issues concerning lawyer professionalism.6 Judges
share self-interested reasons for putting public protection before lawyers' interests.7 When lawyers harm the public, this negatively affects the public's perception of the legal profession and the judiciary.
Of course, state courts do impose requirements on lawyers that protect the public. Yet courts mostly do so when the organized bar advocates for or approves of
those requirements. This can be seen in demanding state bar admission requirements, which were championed by the American Bar Association ("ABA") and
other bar organizations.8 Likewise, state courts have acted to substantially improve

states are also considering proposals to license nonlawyer legal services providers. See, e.g., Aebra Coe, Like It
or Not, Law May Open Its Doors to Nonlawyers, LAw360 (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1201357/like-it-or-not-law-may-open-its-doors-to-nonlawyers [https://perma.cc/WR7F-NVE4]; Jason Tashea,
Oregon Bar Considering Paraprofessional Licensing and Bar-Takers Without JDs, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 7, 2019),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oregon-bar-to-consider-paraprofe ssional-licensing-and-bar-takerswithout-jds [https://perma.cc/R6SB-8LJP].
3. See Laurel S. Terry, The Power of Lawyer Regulatorsto Increase Client and Public ProtectionThrough
Adoption of a ProactiveRegulation System, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 717, 772 (2016).
4. See, e.g., Kimberly Kirkland, The Ethics of Constructing Truth: The CorporateLitigator'sApproach, in
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 158, 164-68 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather
eds., 2012); Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and Thrive:
A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 152, 165-67
(2012).
5. All of the states require lawyers to graduate from law school or otherwise engage in law study and demonstrate that they possess the requisite character to practice law. See NAT'L CONE. OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM.
BAR ASS'N, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2019, at 9-12, http://www.ncbex.org/

assets/BarAdmissionGuide/NCBE-CompGuide-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ6B-99ZP]. Virtually all states
require passage of a bar examination. Id. at Charts 1 & 3. All states except California have adopted some
version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model
Rules, AM. BAR ASS'N (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
publications/model rules-of professionalconduct/alpha list state adopting model rules [https://perma.
cc/GC2F-4RSZ].
6. For example, the Conference of Chief Justices has a Professionalism and the Competence of the Bar
Committee. See Committees, CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, http://ccj.ncsc.org/Committees.aspx [https://perma.cc/
6XEK-6GBH] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
7. The terms "judges" and "justices" are used interchangeably in this Article to refer to judges on the states'
highest courts. While these individuals are usually referred to as "justices," in Maryland and New York they
are called "judges."
8. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 6, 54-55, 57, 63, 68 (1989); MICHAEL J. POWELL: FROM
PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 36
(1988);

TERENCE

C.

HALLIDAY, BEYOND

EMPOWERMENT 76 (1987).

MONOPOLY:

LAWYERS,

STATE

CRISES,

AND PROFESSIONAL
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lawyer discipline systems in response to the ABA's recommendations.9 State
lawyers' rules of professional conduct are variations on the ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.10 State bar association committees or court-appointed
task forces (composed exclusively or predominantly of lawyers) usually produce
the initial draft of proposed rules, and state courts often approve these proposals
with little or no change. 1
To be clear, many of the ABA's proposals serve to protect the public. For
example, the ABA Model Rules require lawyers who hold client funds to maintain them in a separate bank account and to account for them promptly.1 2 These
requirements can be inconvenient for lawyers. Yet lawyer thefts of client funds
also hurt the legal profession. Thefts undermine the professional project, i.e., lawyers' efforts to raise their status and protect their monopoly over the provision of
legal services.13 Failure to regulate lawyers to prevent lawyer thefts may endanger the legal profession's ability to continue to be so deeply involved in its own
regulation. Thus, when bar associations propose rules that protect the public, their
motivations are not entirely altruistic. Moreover, much lawyer regulation stops
short of imposing requirements that adequately protect the public."
Some of the reasons why courts defer to the organized bar when regulating
lawyers have been described elsewhere." Less studied is the question of why
courts occasionally adopt public-regarding laws even when the organized bar or
other lawyers oppose them. 16 Courts may do so when it makes their work easier.
For example, courts may permit non-lawyers to provide certain legal services to
unrepresented litigants, making court proceedings more efficient.1 7 Courts may
9. In 1970, the ABA recommended several changes in disciplinary enforcement, including state-wide centralization of lawyer discipline under the control of the state's highest court. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON
EVALUATION

OF

DISCIPLINARY

ENFORCEMENT,

PROBLEMS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IN

DISCIPLINARY

ENFORCEMENT 8, 24 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1970). Many courts subsequently adopted the Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement, which provided for a hearing process that was dominated by lawyers. See MODEL
RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 3A (AM. BAR ASS'N 2002).
10. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, supra note 5; Jurisdictional Rules
Comparison Charts, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/policy/
rule_charts/ [https://perma.cc/DZ5Z-SMHS].
11. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing JudicialRegulationof Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.
J. 73, 94 (2009).
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

13. See, e.g., ABEL, supranote 8, at 158, 163.
14. For example, the Model Rules permit lawyers to reveal client confidences to prevent client fraud that is
likely to cause substantial financial injury to another, but do not require it, and only permit it if the lawyer's
services were used. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
15. See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 137-38

(2011); Lawrence W. Kessler, The UnchangingFace of Legal Malpractice:How the "Captured"Regulatorsof
the Bar ProtectAttorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (2002).
16. The term "public-regarding laws" is used in this Article to mean statutes, court rules, or regulations that
benefit the public rather than the interests of lawyers.
17. This occurred when the Washington Supreme Court adopted rules permitting Limited License Legal
Technicians to provide out-of-court representation in family law cases, notwithstanding strong opposition by
the Washington State Bar Association's Family Law section. See Brooks Holland, The Washington State
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also adopt public-regarding rules to head off legislation aimed at lawyers; such
legislation challenges the courts' claims that they have the exclusive power to
regulate in this area. Some state courts may depart from the bar's preferences
because of the history and culture of the court. Each supreme court develops "its
own understanding of its responsibilities-its particular jurisprudential orientation and attitude toward legal change, its relationship to other political and legal
institutions, and its pattern of intracourt interaction." 18
Although this discussion has focused on courts, state legislatures sometimes
play an important role in lawyer regulation. Even in states where courts claim
exclusive authority to regulate lawyers, that claim usually focuses on issues relating to admission and discipline. 19 State courts may accede to legislative efforts to
regulate lawyers when the legislation is viewed as "in aid of' judicial functions
or it arises in other contexts. 20 In some cases, legislative involvement in lawyer
regulation is pro forma; in others, it can involve a complex political negotiation
among courts, legislators, lawyer organizations, and (rarely) other advocates acting in the public interest.
This Article seeks to identify conditions under which some states will adopt
more public-regarding laws-even in the face of lawyer opposition-while
others are unwilling or unable to do so. To explore this question, it looks at a single issue: how states have addressed concerns about uninsured lawyers. Most
developed common law countries and European civil law countries require lawyers in private practice to carry lawyer professional liability ("LPL") insurance.2 1
Yet while many states require doctors and other members of licensed occupations
to carry liability insurance, the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not require
lawyers to do so. In some states, more than 40% of solo practitioners are uninsured.22 When uninsured lawyers make mistakes, their victims often cannot find
another lawyer to represent them in a malpractice case.23 This is because many
victims can only afford to sue on a contingent fee basis. If there is no insurance,
there are usually no other assets available to compensate the malpractice lawyer.

Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75,
97-99 (2013).
18. G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 237

(1988).
19. See Leon Green, The Courts' Power Over Admission and Disbarment, 4 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1925);
see also infra notes 225, 264, 322, 361, 407-08 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., In re Kaufman, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (Idaho 1949); infra note 324 and accompanying text.
21. HERBERT M. KRITZER & NEIL VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP: IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE VICTIMS 171 (2018). Australia, Canada, and England also require lawyers to carry
LPL insurance. Id.
22. E-mail from Jim Grogan, Deputy Admin. & Chief Counsel, Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Comm'n, to Leslie C. Levin (July 19, 2016) (on file with author).
23. Lawyer professional liability can arise from negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
and intentional torts such as fraud and misrepresentation. See RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:1
(West 2020). The term "malpractice" is used in this Article to encompass all of these causes of action.
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Consequently, victims often cannot recover from uninsured lawyers for the injuries they sustained.
In fact, most lawyers in private practice recognize the value of LPL insurance
and are insured. Yet without an insurance requirement, insured lawyers may be
drawn into malpractice suits because another attorney involved in the matter may
be uninsured." An insurance requirement may also increase the public's trust in
lawyers. 26 But some lawyers strongly believe they will be harmed by an insurance
requirement. Some think that having insurance encourages malpractice lawsuits." Others do not want to pay for it, often because they are part-time or essentially retired and are not earning much from law practice. A few claim they
cannot obtain coverage or cannot afford it at the price at which it is offered. 28
Consequently, instead of requiring lawyers to carry LPL insurance, some states
have taken half-way measures endorsed by the ABA. Seven states now require
uninsured lawyers to provide written disclosure of their lack of coverage to clients. Yet even if clients read these disclosures, they are unlikely to understand
their implications or to feel like they can switch lawyers. Nine other states post
insurance lawyers' information on state court or judicial websites. These disclosure regimes are inadequate to alert the public that lawyers are uninsured or of
the potential danger of hiring an uninsured lawyer. They are largely "symbolic
reassurance" that the public is benefiting from the law. 29 The remaining states
have taken little or no action to protect the public from uninsured lawyers.
Using debates over malpractice insurance requirements, this Article explores
some of the reasons for the differences in the states' willingness to regulate

24. The percentage of insured private practitioners ranges from about 80% in Arizona and Michigan to 94%
in South Dakota. See Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers Going Bare and Clients Going Blind, 68 FLA. L. REv. 1281,
1299, 1301-02 (2016). A much higher percentage of solo lawyers are uninsured. Id. at 1282 n.1.
25. Id. at 1324; Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn Lease Simpson, O Brother, O Sisters, Art Thou Not Insured?:
The Casefor MandatoryDisclosure of MalpracticeInsuranceCoverage,PA. LAw., May-June 2002, at 28, 32.
26. Uninsured lawyers can undermine the individual client's trust in lawyers when a client discovers she has
no meaningful recourse against an uninsured lawyer. Public trust is also undermined when the news media
report stories about clients who cannot recover for the harm caused by those lawyers. See, e.g., Robert Elder,
Limited Help for Lawyers' Victims, AUSTIN AM. STATESMEN, June 23, 2008, at Al (describing a client who had
a large malpractice judgment against an uninsured lawyer); Molly Selvin, Lawyers Split on Insurance
Proposal, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2007), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-ju-02-fi-legal2-story.
html [https://perma.cc/7RX8-JJ4E] (describing a client who could only recover a "tiny fraction" of a judgment
against an uninsured lawyer); Andrew Wolfson, Noninsured Lawyer Costs Woman, COURIER J. (June 16,
2014), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2014/06/16/lawyers-lack-insurance-costs-okolonawoman/10638183/ [https://perma.cc/HJ5V-LGW7] (describing an uninsured lawyer who filed for bankruptcy
to avoid paying a malpractice judgment to a disabled client).
27. For example, in a survey of more than 1000 Nevada lawyers, more than 50% agreed or strongly agreed
that having insurance encourages malpractice lawsuits. See In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79,
Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, ADKT 534 (Nev. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2018), at Ex. C.
28. See Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandatory MalpracticeInsurancefor Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of
Public Protectionwithout Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 647 (1995); Levin, supra note 24, at
1282, 1291-95.
29. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 4,22-23 (1985).
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lawyers in ways that favor the public's interests. It employs case studies to identify possibly relevant factors. 30 Part I briefly describes the history of lawyer regulation in the United States and explains why lawyers continue to play such a
significant role in their own regulation. Part II looks more closely at the institutional actors involved in lawyer regulation: the courts, the legislatures, and bar
organizations. It discusses the reasons why courts often regulate in ways that
favor the legal profession's preferences and why legislatures are (somewhat) less
likely to favor lawyers. The Article then discusses some differences between
mandatory and voluntary state bar organizations and some factors that influence
their decisionmaking. In Part III, the Article recounts the history of the debate
over malpractice insurance requirements and some of the arguments against it. It
also discusses the ABA's Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure and demonstrates why an insurance requirement better serves the public's interests. Part IV
of the Article looks closely at how Oregon (forty years ago), and six other states
(California, Idaho, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington), have handled
the regulation of uninsured lawyers relatively recently. The Article discusses the
political culture of the states, the historical context in which the insurance issue
arose, and the role played by the state courts, the legislature, and the bar.
Drawing on the case studies, Part V then identifies some factors that seemingly
affect whether states will adopt public-regarding laws concerning LPL insurance.
These factors include whether the organized bar supports it, the applicable lawmaking or rulemaking process, the mandatory or voluntary nature of the state bar,
the views of the leadership, and the opportunities for lawyers opposed to the
measures to directly lobby against the law. In the Conclusion, the Article briefly
considers when states are likely to adopt public-regarding laws governing lawyers. It suggests some areas for further research and some possible ways to ensure
that the public interest receives appropriate consideration in debates over lawyer
regulation.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAWYER (CO-)REGULATION

Lawyer regulation is often described either as a product of lawyer "selfregulation" or as a power residing largely in the state's highest court.3 1 The first
characterization is inaccurate. The second is incomplete. Lawyer regulation is

30. Case studies have significant limitations. See Paul Brace et al., Placing Supreme Courts in State
Politics, 1 STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 81, 83-84 (2001). They can be useful, however, to help identify factors that
subsequently can be studied in a larger number of states, using quantitative methods. See, e.g., Richard P.
Caldarone et al., Partisan Labels and Democratic Accountability: An Analysis of State Supreme Court
Abortion Decisions, 71 J. POL. 560, 569 (2009) (using quantitative methods to determine how intensity of public opinion, timing of elections, and type of contested election affects judicial decisions on abortion in eighteen
states).
31. See MODEL RULES pmbl. (noting that the legal profession is "largely self-governing" but that "ultimate
authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts").
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usually a product of co-regulation by state courts, the legislature, and the organized bar, and to a lesser extent, by Congress and administrative agencies.
For the first hundred years after the American Revolution, state legislatures
and the judiciary regulated lawyers.32 Some courts maintained that if the state
constitution did not explicitly delegate power over the legal profession to the
courts, such power lay with the legislature. 33 Other courts claimed an inherent
authority to regulate the admission and discipline of lawyers.34 In the late nineteenth century, a few courts began to declare they had the exclusive right to regulate the conduct of lawyers.35 This claim was grounded in separation of powers,
language in state constitutions, and the idea that lawyers were "officers of the
court." 36
During the 1870s, elite lawyers formed voluntary bar associations such as the
ABA, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("ABCNY"), and the
Chicago Bar Association ("CBA"), in part, to raise the status and competence of
lawyers.37 These bar associations quickly moved to regulate lawyers by establishing
committees to handle lawyer discipline. 38 At that time, the courts were not performing that function unless lawyer misconduct occurred in court. 39 The elite bar organizations also sought to raise bar admission standards and to persuade states to

32. See Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An
HistoricalAnalysis, 32 BUFF. L. REv. 525, 533 (1983). The history of lawyer regulation during that period has
been well-documented elsewhere. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 305,
316-22 (2d ed. 1985); GERARD W. GEWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1760-1840, at 60-61, 107, 182-88 (1979); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY

TO MODERN TIMES 163-64, 167-68, 172-73, 182-92, 198, 208, 227-28 (1953); CHARLES WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 508-39 (1966).

33. See In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 93 (1860); Alpert, supra note 32, at 536.
34. See Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed
Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783, 784-86 (1976); see also Ex Parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47, 48 (1867); In re
Woolley, 74 Ky. 95, 111-12 (1875); In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392, 393-94 (1850). Some courts explicitly tied their
inherent authority to discipline to their authority to admit lawyers. See, e.g., Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149, 15657 (1860); In re Mulford, 1 Cal. 143, 150 (1850); People ex rel. Moses v. Goodrich, 79 Ill. 148, 153 (1875); In
re Payton, 12 Kan. 398, 403-04 (1874); Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592, 597-600 (1874); Sanborn v.
Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 146 (1875); In re Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 120-21 (1880).
35. See In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 653 (Ill. 1899); In re Splane, 16 A. 481, 483 (Pa. 1889); Green, supra note
19, at 11-12; Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers
Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1989).
36. Alpert, supra note 32, at 539-41.
37. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 44-45; HALLIDAY, supra note 8, at 64-65; POWELL, supra note 8, at 7.
38. The ABCNY formed a committee to hear grievances in 1870 and first brought charges against a lawyer
in 1877. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF

THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970, at 355, 361 (1970); Albert P. Blaustein, The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York: 1970-1951, 6 REC. ASS'N B. OF CITY OF N.Y. 261, 265-66 (1951). The CBA
formed a Grievance Committee in 1874 and first brought a disbarment proceeding against a lawyer in 1875.
See People v. Leary, 84 111. 190, 190 (1876); HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR ASS'N
1874-1974, at 42 (1974).
39. POWELL, supra note 8, at 19.
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adopt higher pre-legal educational requirements. 40 The bars' efforts contributed to
the perception that the bar was, and should be, responsible for its own regulation. 41
By 1916, there were forty-eight state or territorial bar associations, but some
had very few members.4 2 Starting in the 1920s, some state bars became mandatory (or "unified") bars to which all lawyers were required to pay dues and belong
as a condition of licensure. 43 Much of the impetus for the mandatory bar movement came from lawyers who sought to create an autonomous, self-regulating
legal profession with the power to establish its own admissions criteria, ethical
standards, and disciplinary process.' Proponents of mandatory state bars
believed that a state-wide, compulsory, and well-financed bar could benefit the
economic interests of lawyers, allow them to speak with one voice, and influence
the legislature more than a voluntary organization. 45
Both mandatory and voluntary bar organizations also played an important role
in lawyer regulation through their development of codes of conduct. In 1908, the
ABA drafted its first Canons of Ethics.46 The Canons were adopted, with minor
variations, by virtually all the states. 47 In 1969, the ABA promulgated a Model
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility to govern the legal profession, which most
state courts adopted with variations. 4 8 This again occurred in 1983, after the ABA
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. To this day, state courts consider and adopt rule changes as the ABA amends its Model Rules.4 9 These rules
40. ABEL, supra note 8, at 46-49, 54, 68-69; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 94-101 (1976); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional
Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491,499-501 (1985).
41. POWELL, supra note 8, at 27.
42. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 46; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 287 (1950).
43. HALLIDAY, supra note 8, at 82.
44. DAYTON D. MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 40 (1963); William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of
Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 485, 518-19
(1995). Herbert Harley, the most influential early proponent of mandatory bars, advocated for a model like the
Upper Law Society of Ottawa, which included all Ottawa lawyers and formulated standards for admission, discipline, and legal education. See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept:
Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 9, 18 (1983).
45. MCKEAN, supra note 44, at 34, 36, 76; Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism:
How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35, 38-39 (1994).
46. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
47. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 47 A.B.A. REP. 466, 467
(1924).
48. See William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ad Rules Infinitum: The Need for Alternatives to State-Based Ethics
Governing Legal Services Marketing, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 49,56 (2002).
49. This process is the primary basis for the claim that the bar "self-regulates." Indeed, some courts have
reflexively repeated this claim. See, e.g., In re Buckelew, 731 P.2d 48,55 (Alaska 1986) ("Society allows the legal
profession the privilege of self-regulation."); People v. Kanwal, 357 P.3d 1236, 1246 (Colo. 2015) (noting lawyers are a "self-regulating profession"); Averill v. Cox, 761 A.2d 1083, 1089 (N.H. 2000) (noting that "the legal
profession is self-regulated"); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Burns, 145 P.3d 1088, 1095 (Okla. 2006) (noting that the legal profession "is self-regulated"). As Fred Zacharias observed, however, when regulators such as
courts and legislators can trump the regulatory activities of lawyers, lawyers cannot be said to be engaged in
"self-regulation." See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1147, 1153 (2009).
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articulate the basis on which lawyers can be disciplined, and in some states, can
be considered in legal malpractice cases as evidence of the duty of care.? 0
State legislatures can also serve as a significant co-regulator of the legal profession. In states such as California, the legislature plays a substantial role in lawyer
regulation. Even where state courts claim the exclusive authority to regulate the
legal profession," these courts will sometimes accede to laws enacted by the state
legislature as a matter of comity.P In the areas of admission and discipline, where
courts jealously guard their prerogative to regulate lawyers, legislatures can
sometimes enact reasonable regulations concerning admission and discipline in
aid of the courts' powers, so long as the ultimate power of admission or disbarment lies with the courts.54 State legislatures sometimes created mandatory bars
at the request of lawyer organizations.55 In addition, state legislatures sometimes
enact other laws that impose responsibilities on lawyers, such as requirements for
fee agreements and for handling client funds. 56
Finally, federal lawmakers also regulate the legal profession and the practice
of law. Federal law enables lawyers who engage in an exclusively federal practice
such as patent or immigration law to practice in states in which they are not licensed.57 Lawyers must comply with additional federal requirements to practice
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 58 Federal agencies-including the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review-can impose discipline on lawyers. 59 The focus of this Article, however,
is on the states, where most lawyer regulation occurs.
II. REGULATORY CAPACITY, EXPERTISE, AND INCENTIVES: THEORIES
OF WHY THE REGULATORS ACT

To understand why some states are able to implement lawyer regulation that
favors the public notwithstanding lawyer opposition, it is necessary to look
50. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §§

1-9

(West 2018).

51. See, e.g., infra notes 272-73, 277, 289 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., NISHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Grp., LLC, 399 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Ark. 2012) (noting the
court's "exclusive authority" to regulate the practice of law); Turner v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 980 S.W.2d 560, 563
(Ky. 1998) (noting the judiciary's exclusive power to make rules governing the practice of law); Miss. Bar v.
McGuire, 647 So. 2d 706, 708 (Miss. 1994) (noting the court has asserted "its exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of matters pertaining to attorney discipline"); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass'n v. Davie, 977 N.E.2d 606, 616
(Ohio 2012) (stating that state supreme court has "exclusive power to regulate, control, and define the practice
of law in Ohio").
53. See Wolfram, supra note 35, at 16.
54. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Cleaning Up the Legal Profession: The Power to Discipline-The Judiciary
and the Legislature, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 413, 418 (1978).
55. See MCKEAN, supra note 44, at 41-42.
56. See, e.g., CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-81c (2019); N.Y.
JUD. LAw § 497 (West 2019).
57. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 401 (1963); 8 C.F.R. § 292.1 (2019).
58. 37 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2019).
59. See SEC Rules of Practice 102(e) (2018); 8 CFR §1003.105 (2019).
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closely at the main regulators-the courts, legislatures, and the bar-to identify
their capacity, expertise, and incentives to effect change. Before proceeding,
however, it is useful to briefly describe some of the theoretical explanations for
the behavior of government institutions and interest groups.
Public choice theory posits that elected officials, like all individuals, are
rational actors who act to maximize their own welfare when they create law. 60
The theory initially focused on legislators and administrative agencies, but has
also been applied to courts. 61 Interest group theory attempts to explain regulatory
outcomes as a result of pressures brought to bear by interest groups that have
enough influence to affect the regulatory process. 62 Economist George Stigler
argued that industries (and occupations) seek government regulation primarily
for their own benefit, not for the benefit of the general public. 63 Further, producers
of goods and services are more likely to invest in political action than are consumers due to producers' narrow focus on their own products or income, in contrast to consumers' more varied areas of concern. 64 Thus, certain groups "enjoy
organizational advantages that enable them to exercise 'disproportionate' influence on politicians and regulators and thus secure laws favoring their interests
even when those laws injure large groups with diverse interests (e.g., the general
public).'' 65 Many politically contested issue areas involve several groups with different interests, but some issue areas "are elitist, ruled by a single coalition or perhaps hav[e] just a handful of influential groups. "66
One way in which industries achieve their goals is through regulatory capture.
Regulatory capture is a process by which regulation "is consistently or repeatedly
directed away from the public interest and toward the interest of the regulated
industry by the intent and actions of the industry itself.'' 67 Capture can occur

60. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Introduction:A BriefTrajectory of Public Choice and
Public Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 2 (2010); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public

Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 228 (2016); Jonathan R.
Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43,
52-53 (1988).
61. See Brace et al., supranote 30, at 93; Farber & O'Connell, supra note 60, at 5.
62. While many scholars use the term "interest group theory," some describe it as a strand of public choice
research. See, e.g., Roger D. Congleston, Intellectual Foundationsof Public Choice, the Forestfrom the Trees,
175 PUB. CHOICE 229, 231 (2019).
63. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of EconomicRegulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3-13 (1971).
64. Another explanation is that smaller groups are more likely to work effectively because it is easier for
them to overcome the free rider problem. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 10-36 (1965); Farber & O'Connell, supra note 60, at 10.
65. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE
L.J. 31, 42 (1995); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 33 (1991).
66. See Andrew McFarland, Interest Group Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL

PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 37,42 (L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010).
67. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction,in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOw TO LIMIT IT 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014); see also
Ernesto Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture:A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 203, 203 (2006).
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when regulators "depend too much on the industries they regulate for information, political support, or guidance," when the revolving door between an agency
and the regulated industry allows industry to tempt regulators with benefits
(including future employment), and in other ways. 68 Capture also occurs because
the cultural or social influence of repeated interaction with the regulated industry
may cause the regulator to think like the regulated industry and fail to "easily conceive another way of approaching its problems." 69 Theories of capture are most
often applied to administrative agencies and to legislatures, but have also been
applied to courts. 70 Some ways in which capture occurs in the context of lawyer
regulation are described below.
A. THE COURTS

Political scientists have extensively researched state supreme courts,7 1
although not with respect to their role in lawyer regulation. As public choice
theory suggests, some judicial behavior is motivated by the desire to be re-elected
or reappointed.72 Judicial actions are also influenced by institutional arrangements, the external political context, and the state's legal environment.73
In many states, the organized bar-and not the courts-has taken the lead in
lawyer regulation. Courts are busy with their main work-deciding cases-and
lawyer regulation is not at the top of their agendas. 74 They lack the time and
resources to do their own fact-gathering on issues relating to lawyer regulation. 5
Consequently, they often rely on lawyer organizations to bring ideas to them,
study issues, hold hearings, make recommendations, and draft language effecting
changes in lawyer regulation. In some states, statutes or court rules provide for
participation by bar organizations in this process. 76 As interest group theory suggests, the input from bar organizations tends to favor lawyers' interests.
It is not surprising that lawyers' views of regulation prevail. They not only
help set the agenda, frame the issues, and make concrete proposals, but they also

&

68. Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 8 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 4-5 (2010); see also James Kwak,
CulturalCapture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 67, at 75, 90.
69. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 67, at 18.
70. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543 (2018) (passim); Keith R. Fisher, The
Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1017, 1113-16 (2004); Kessler, supra note 15,
at 465-66; Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 519.
71. See, e.g., TARR & PORTER, supra note 18; Brace et al., supra note 30, at 82-83.
72. Scholars disagree whether judicial appointment or a certain type of election (partisan, non-partisan, or
retention) is more likely to cause judges to act in accord with their own preferences. See CHRIS W. BONNEAU
MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2, 132, 137-38 (2009); Melinda Gann Hall,

Representation in State Supreme Courts: Evidence from the Terminal Term, 67 POL. RES. Q. 335, 337 (2014).
73. Brace et al., supra note 30, at 84.
74. See BARTON, supra note 15, at 137.
75. Benjamin Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer
Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1207 (2003).
76. See e.g., 2006 ALA. CODE § 34-3-43(3) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-21, 84-23(a) (2019); infra notes
207-08 and accompanying text.
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have unique access to judges. Lawyers have many opportunities to lobby judges
to advance their interests: in the courthouse, in bar association activities, and in
social situations.77 It is more difficult for other industries or consumer groups to
obtain access to judges. 78 Moreover, as interest group theory predicts, there are
few organized advocates representing the public interest on issues pertaining to
lawyer regulation.79 Lawyer regulation generally is not an issue on which the
public's interests are effectively communicated to the courts.
At the same time, courts tend to favor the legal profession's interests due to an
"ambient bias" in favor of lawyers. 80 As Dennis Jacobs, former Chief Judge of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained, judges are "proud of being lawyers."81
Judges are socialized in law school to "think like a lawyer," and typically practice
law for several years before entering the judiciary. They "have a high regard for
our profession, its processes, its culture and values, and its judgments-the profession which (after all) did loft judges to the bench, where they presumably wanted
to go.'"82 As a result, judges identify with lawyers and "[o]n a subconscious level
when judges face a question that will affect the legal profession, judges naturally
react in terms of how it will affect 'us' more than 'them."' 83
Furthermore, courts derive institutional benefits from maintaining good relations with the bar. Bar associations support the judiciary's efforts to increase the
number of judges, their compensation, and funding for the judicial system. 84
They defend the judiciary when it is under attack. 85 Bar associations assist the

77. Barton, supranote 75, at 1188, 1200.
78. BARTON, supranote 15, at 133.
79. But see infra notes 354, 497 and accompanying text. Starting in 1978, an organization known as HALT
(Help Abolish Legal Tyranny) advocated for changes in lawyer regulation. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's
Clothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor Imposing Lawyer DisciplineSanctions, 48 AM. U. LAW REV.
1, 26 (1998). In 2004, HALT urged the ABA to adopt a rule requiring lawyers to purchase LPL insurance. See
Devin S. Mills & Galina Petrova, Modeling Optimal Mandates: A Case Study on the Controversy Over
Mandatory ProfessionalLiability Coverage and Its Disclosure, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1029, 1036 (2009).
That organization, now known as Responsive Law, does not appear to have been active in the more recent insurance debates. See Advocacy, RESPONSIVE LAW (2020), https://www.responsivelaw.org/advocacy.html

[https://perma.cc/9WZW-38LV].
80. BARTON, supranote 15, at 1.
81. Dennis Jacobs, The Secret Life of Judges, 75 FORD. L. REV. 2855, 2856 (2007).
82. Id. at 2859.
83. BARTON, supranote 15, at 37.
84. Barton, supra note 75, at 1198; Bench and Bar Respond to JudicialPay Deadlock, N.Y. L.J., May 14,
2008; Barbara Jones, Minnesota Courts Get $62.7M BudgetBoostfrom Lawmakers, MINN. LAW., July 9, 2001;
Joel Stashenko, StagedRaise of27% is Endorsedfor Judges, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 2011, at 1.
85. This can be seen when bar associations responded to President Donald Trump's attacks on federal
judges. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Judicial Independence "Not Up for Negotiation," ABA President Says in
Speech Addressing Trump Tweets, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
klein_the_aba_must_defend_the_rule_oflaw_and_theindepencenceof thejudic/ [https://perma.cc/7UHTMWQB]. It also occurs when bar associations act to defend state court judges. See, e.g., Russomanno Urges
Lawyers to Take the Lead Defending Judicial Independence, FLA. B. NEWS (Jan. 15, 2001), https://www.
floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/russomanno-urges-lawyers-to-take-the-lead-defending-judicial-independence/
[https://perma.cc/6VW9-GAM].
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courts by making recommendations to improve courts' organization, administration, and procedural rules. 86 They also work to address the problem of access to
justice for unrepresented litigants, which has become a "crisis" for the courts. 87
Judges also derive personal benefits from maintaining good relations with the
bar. One common method of selecting state supreme court justices is elections, 88
and lawyers often contribute substantial sums to these campaigns. 89 Even when
judges are initially appointed, they must often stand for single-candidate retention
elections when their terms expire. 90 Lawyers sit on commissions that recommend
which lawyers should be appointed judges, which judges should be elevated to
higher judicial positions, and which judges should be retained. 91 Bar associations
sometimes endorse judicial candidates or rate judges and judge-aspirants as "recommended" or "not recommended." 92 At or before the age of mandatory retirement, state supreme court judges may move into private practice. 93 Good
relationships with the bar can facilitate their job searches.
86. POWELL, supra note 8, at 197-99, 201-02; Terence C. Halliday, Legal Professions and the State:
Neocorporatist Variations on the Pluralist Theme of Liberal Democracies, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:
COMPARATIVE THEORIES 410 (Richard L. Abel & Philip C.S. Lewis eds., 1989).
87. See Access to Justice Commissions: Increasing Effectiveness Through Adequate Staffing and Funding,
ABA RESOURCE CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST. INITIATIVES

12, 33, 35 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/

content/dam/aba/administrative/egalaidindigentdefendants/lssclaidatj_ commission report.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6CZR-VZGV]. These efforts include bar-sponsored programs to directly assist
unrepresented litigants. See, e.g., In Court Bar Program, COOK COUNTY BAR ASS'N (Apr. 2014), https://
cookcountybar.org/membership/in-court-bar-program [https://perma.cc/AVS9-793U]; BBA Lawyer for the
Day in Boston Housing Court, BOSTON BAR ASS'N, http://www.bostonbar.org/in-the-community/publicservice/housing-court-lawyer-for-the-day-program [https://perma.cc/NH8F-PDDA] (last visited Apr. 28,
2020).
88. See ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CHOOSING STATE JUDGES: A PLAN FOR REFORM 3
(2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018_ 09JudicialSelection.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S7SZ-HSXJ].
89. See, e.g., Arielle Dreher, Buying Justice: 'Dark Money' in Judicial Elections, JACKSON FREE PRESS
(Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2016/nov/16/buying-justice-dark-money-judicialelections/ [https://perma.cc/F68P-8MZA] (reporting that most of one supreme court justice's $586,000 in
campaign contributions came from attorneys).
90. BANNON, supra note 88, at 3. In most states where supreme court justices are appointed, they must be
reappointed to maintain their positions. Id.
91. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 3.
92. See, e.g., Ohio State Bar Association Commission on Judicial Candidates Announces Ohio Supreme
Court Candidate Ratings for the 2018 Election, OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N, https://www.ohiobar.org/about-us/
media-center/osba-news/ohio-state-bar-association-commission-on-judicial-candidates-announces-ohio-supremecourt-candidate-ratings-for-the-2018-election/ [https://perma.cc/93BG-4N6H]; Barbara Vitello, Bar Associations
Release Cook County Judicial Candidate Recommendations, DAILY HERALD (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.
dailyherald.com/news/20180301/bar-associations-release-cook-county-judicial-candidate-recommendations
[https://
perma.cc/5FQP-KHNE].
93. See, e.g., Matt Chiappardi, Retiring Del. Justice Jack Jacobs to Join Sidley Austin, LAw360, June 13,
2014; Martin Daks, After Hanging up their Robes, Judges Find Career Options in NJ Law Firms, NJBIz.COM
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://njbiz.com/after-hanging-up-the-robes-judges-find-career-options-in-nj-aw-firms-3/
[https://perma.cc/4K2E-5LCR]; Mary Hladky, Retired Justice Grimes Rejoins Holland & Knight in
Tallahassee, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., July 9, 1998; Alexander Peters, Broussard Joins Coblentz Firm as
Partner, THE RECORDER, Dec. 4, 1991; Sheri Qualters, Retired Maine High Court Justice Returns to Firm,
NAT'L L. J., June 26, 2007; Justice Alexander Returning to Private Practice, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 9,
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Cultural capture also helps to explain why judges often defer to the legal profession's interests. Drawing on behavioral economic and psychological research,
James Kwak shows how cultural capture occurs through shared identity, perception of status, and social relationships. 94 Cultural capture can produce the same
outcome as traditional capture, i.e., regulatory action that serves the ends of
industry. 95 As Kwak notes, "the more complex and information-intensive an issue
is and the less capacity the agency has to devote to the issue, the greater the potential importance of cultural capture." 96 Some factors that should make cultural
capture especially influential:
are a high degree of similarity between industry representatives and regulators;
an industry with a notable social purpose with which regulators can identify;
an industry with high social, cultural, or intellectual status; many social connections between industry and regulators; and technically complex issues for
which it is not clear how the benefits of policy alternatives are shared. 97

It is not difficult to see how capture occurs in the courts' regulation of the legal
profession. State supreme court justices are dependent on the legal profession to
gather facts, analyze issues, and make recommendations concerning lawyer regulation. In addition, judges enter their positions believing-as they learned in law
school-that the legal profession is, and should remain, "self-governing."98
While they also identify as judges, their thoughts and actions "are influenced by
the group affiliation that is most salient in a given context." 99 Simply stated,
judges-like all people-tend to identify with other people who are a lot like
them and they tilt toward helping people who are similar.10' As between the interests of lawyers and the public, judges are more likely to identify with lawyers,
especially when there are rarely opposing interest groups that are advocating for
the public's interests. 101 Their judgments are distorted in ways in which they are
not even aware.10

2

2011), available at https://www.heraldnet.com/news/justice-alexander-returning-to-private-practice/
[https://
perma.cc/RA4Y-LY9T].
94. Kwak, supra note 68, at 80. For example, shared identification with a group makes people more generous to the in-group members, and also more trusting of those members. Id. at 81. Relationships also affect
behavior because people care about what other people think about them, and especially those with whom they
frequently come in contact. Id. at 89.
95. Id. at 79.
96. Id. at 93.
97. Id. at 95.
98. See, e.g., MODEL RULES pmbl. (noting that the legal profession "is largely self-governing" and that "[t]o
the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated").
99. Kwak, supra note 68, at 82 (making this observation in the agency context).
100. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 125 (7th
ed. 2009).
101. See BARTON, supranote 15, at 37.
102. See BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 100, at 130; Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a
Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND
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Of course, judges have been known to express public disapproval-or even
contempt-for the practices of large swaths of the legal profession. Chief Justice
Warren Burger famously noted that many trial lawyers are "not competent to
give effective representation to their clients." 103 Former Seventh Circuit Judge
Richard Posner criticized the legal profession for acting like medieval craft
guilds. 104 Yet these critiques came from federal judges with lifetime tenure.'
State supreme court justices tend to be more circumspect.
B. STATE LEGISLATURES

In theory, state legislatures should be more likely than courts to enact laws that
protect the public notwithstanding bar opposition. Perhaps most significantly,
most legislators are not lawyers 106 and may not be as naturally sympathetic to the
legal profession. In contrast to courts, legislatures are not as dependent on bar
associations for assistance with policymaking, because legislatures often have
more staff and capacity to conduct their own research. 107 Moreover, while judges
may need to rely on the bar to defend them from verbal attacks, 108 legislators can
speak much more freely.
State legislators are also less likely than judges to favor lawyers' interests
because they are more accountable to the public. Voters are generally more aware
of who their legislators are and what they do. They are less aware of who the state
supreme court justices are and their role in lawyer regulation.109 Legislators may

SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAw, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 80, 83, 89 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).

Professionals are vulnerable to the same motivated biases as others, including the desire to see themselves as
objective and fair in their decisions. Chugh et al., supra at 89. The "human tendency to support the self and
ingroup creates a gravitational pull toward one set of interests, even when the pull is quite invisible, even to the
self." Id. at 87.
103. Burger Urges Curb on TrialLawyers Not Fully Trained, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1973, at 15.
104. Richard A. Posner, The MaterialBasis of Jurisprudence,69 IND. L. J. 1, 1-3, 7 (1993).
105. See, e.g., Dondi Prop. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286-87 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en
banc) (establishing civility standards because of "unnecessary contention and sharp practices between lawyers"
that threatened the administration ofjustice).
106. It appears that less than 20% of state legislators hold law degrees. Karl Kurz, Who We Elect: The
Demographics of State Legislatures, ST. LEGIS. MAG. (Dec. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-statelegislatures/who-we-elect.aspx [https://perma.cc/8ZTN-VKEC]. In some states, however, the percentage of
lawyers in the legislature is closer to one-third. See, e.g., Ryan Murphy, Getting a Closer Look at the Makeup
of the Leg, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/01/11/legislators-are-younger-littlechange-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/AG2V-AYZJ]; N.J. Legislature's Racial, Ethnic Makeup Out of Step with
State's Demographics, NJ.COM (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/01/analysisnj
legislaturesracia.html [https://perma.cc/K4P8-YMKB].
107. Barton, supranote 75, at 1219.
108. Judges are limited in what they can say publicly about pending and impending cases. MODEL RULES OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014). Even after the case has been resolved, judges may be constrained in their ability to speak. See CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, WHEN JUDGES SPEAK UP:
ETHICS, THE PUBLIC, & THE MEDIA, 18-21 (1998), https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%
20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Publications/When-Judges-Speak-Up-Study-Materials.ashx
[https://perma.cc/
DU2S-77NS].
109. See Barton, supranote 75, at 1222-23; Fisher, supranote 70, at 1115.
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receive campaign contributions from lawyers and bar organizations, but they also
receive contributions from a broad array of other interest groups. 110 It is also much
easier for other interest groups to directly lobby legislators than to lobby supreme
court justices."1 Indeed, the success of tort reform efforts in some states-which
placed caps on recoveries and otherwise limited lawyers' earnings-demonstrates
that other interest groups can at times influence legislators more than lawyer
organizations.1 1

2

Yet legislatures may also be susceptible to regulatory capture by the bar due to
time, resource, and expertise constraints.1 3 Legislators are busy, and can devote
only limited time to the complexities of lawyer regulation. Some serve in parttime legislatures with insufficient staff support,1 4 making them dependent on bar
input on issues relating to lawyer regulation. The legislative committees that deal
with lawyer regulation may be disproportionately composed of lawyers, who
share the bar's views of how the profession should be regulated.1 5 Lawyerlegislators may have an outsized sway on these committees due to their special
knowledge and expertise. 116
Whether state legislators will become involved in lawyer regulation depends
upon a variety of factors, including the extent to which the state courts have
staked out the exclusive authority to regulate the profession. It may also depend
upon the type of legislature; full-time or "professional" legislatures have more
time and resources to perform their work." 7 Legislatures may be statutorily
110. See, e.g., Shannon Jenkins, The Influence of Interest Groups on State Legislative Behavior, 32 AM.
REV. PoL. 233, 238-39 (2011).
111. Barton, supranote 75, at 1121-22.
112. See, e.g., Steve Cohen, On Tort Reform, It's Time to Declare Victory and Withdraw, FORBES (Mar. 2,
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecohen/2015/03/02/on-tort-reform-its-time-to-declare-victory-andwithdraw/#267cfd9c63ea [https://perma.cc/BA36-CLPW] (reporting that more than half the states
implemented tort reform measures that limited recoveries by victims and their lawyers).
113. See Fisher, supranote 70, at 1120-21.
114. The National Conference of State Legislatures categorizes state legislatures based on their capacity to
operate as an independent branch of government. See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures,NAT'L CONE. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-timelegislatures.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CKP-XHGK]. "Full-time legislature" means legislators generally work
80% or more of the time required of a full-time job, are well paid, and have large staffs. "Hybrid" means
legislators spend more than two-thirds of their time being legislators, but their income is not enough to make a
living without other sources, and they have intermediate-sized staffs. "Part-time" legislators spend half of a
full-time job doing legislative work, earn low pay, and have small staffs. Id.
115. In 2020, for example, twenty-one out of the forty Judiciary Committee members in the Connecticut
General Assembly were lawyers. Five out of six of the highest-ranking members of that committee were lawyers. See Joint Committee on Judiciary,CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.cga.ct.gov/jud/ [https://perma.cc/
C396-U2NT] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
116. For a discussion of some ways in which lawyer-legislators differ from non-lawyer legislators and how
these differences may affect legislation, see MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 71-75, 162-74 (1995).

117. Professional legislatures meet for longer time periods, compensate legislators sufficiently that they do
not need another job, and have more staff. Robert E. Hogan, Policy Responsiveness and Incumbent Reelection
in State Legislatures, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 858, 864 (2008). States with more professional legislatures may be
less likely to be dominated by interest groups because public officials are less dependent on the information and
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required to periodically review the activities of a mandatory state bar or a particular lawyer regulation. Or they may be galvanized by public opinion or lobbying
by interest groups. 118 Public choice theory suggests that legislators are likely to
act when it helps them with re-election. If the public does not push for-or seems
indifferent to-lawyer regulation that benefits the public, legislators are less
likely to become involved. 119
C. BAR ORGANIZATIONS

There are hundreds of bar associations in the United States, but the discussion
here will focus primarily on the ABA and state bar associations because they play
such an important role in lawyer regulation.12 0 The ABA, the largest national voluntary bar organization, has more than 400,000 members.121 About 22% of all
U.S. lawyers belong to the ABA. 122 The ABA significantly influences lawyer regulation in the areas of legal education, bar admission, rules of professional conduct, and discipline. Its Center for Professional Responsibility helps develop
conduct standards and assists with implementation in the states.12' The ABA's
Government Affairs Office lobbies the federal government on issues relating to
the legal profession and lawyer regulation.1 2 4
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have mandatory bars created by
statute or court order.1 2' These bars are usually formed as public agencies or public corporations. 126 Their bylaws or mission statements often articulate a direct

technical expertise those groups offer. See DAVID M. HEDGE, GOVERNANCE AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN

STATES 71 (1998).
118. See Carol S. Weissert & Susan Silberman, Legislative Demandsfor BureaucraticPolicymaking: The
Case of State Medical Boards, 27 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 123, 133 (2002).
119. See Gilbert Becker, The Public Interest Hypothesis Revisited: A New Test of Peltzman's Theory of
Regulation, 49 PUB. CHOICE 222, 230 (1986) (noting legislators are more likely to act in the public's interest
when "the public's awareness and voting participation are high").
120. Other local and specialty bar associations also influence lawyer regulation. Theodore Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 677, 678, 703, 710-13, 734 (1989).
121. Molly McDonough, ABA Executive Director Urges Increased Efforts to Reverse Decline in Paid
Membership, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/abamidyearmeeting-jack
rivesmembership [https://perma.cc/7T22-2EYF]. The number includes law students, paralegals, and lawyers
admitted outside the United States.
122. Id.
123. See About Us, AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L REsP., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/AY7N-WZU5] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
124. See Advocacy & Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS'N (Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/
[https://perma.cc/RE6F-M5SY].
125. See Gallagher, supra note 44, at 525-26; Leslie C. Levin, The End of Mandatory State Bars?, 109
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 n.7 (2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/wp-content/
uploads/sites/26/2020/04/LevinThe-End-of-Mandatory-State-Bars.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6YS-EM7Q].
126. See MCKEAN, supra note 44, at 26-27; Who We Are, N.C. BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/about-us/whowe-are/ [https://perma.cc/4BCF-AL4U] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) (describing the Bar as "the government
agency responsible for the regulation of the legal profession in North Carolina"); infra notes 205, 328, 365, 472
and accompanying text. But see Overview, STATE BAR OF WIS., https://www.wisbar.org/aboutus/overview/
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responsibility to the public.' 7 The leadership is typically elected by its lawyer-members, although some have non-lawyer members on their governing boards. 128 Some
mandatory bars have responsibility for admission, lawyer discipline, and other regulatory functions. 12 9 Mandatory bars are usually funded through dues or licensing
fees and other bar activities.130 Most have practice sections (e.g., family law, tax)
that enable lawyers in the same field to meet and stay up-to-date with the law.
The remaining states have voluntary state bar associations, which are composed of lawyers who choose to belong to a state-wide lawyer association. These
organizations typically do not have regulatory responsibilities or view themselves
as having an obligation to protect the public.131 Their leadership does not include
members of the public and they are freer to act like guilds. Most of the lawyers
practicing in some smaller states belong to the voluntary state bar, while less than
half of the lawyers in some large states do so.132
Both types of state bar associations may have difficulty reaching consensus on
issues concerning lawyer regulation because their members' interests vary
depending upon lawyers' practice setting and specialty. If voluntary bar organizations take positions that are unpopular with some members, they risk losing those
members. Mandatory bars-which are frequently sued by disgruntled members

Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/L84E-CNYS] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) (noting that the State Bar is a
private association and not a state agency).
127. See, e.g., Mission, Vision, and Core Values, STATE BAR OF ARiz., https://www.azbar.org/aboutus/
mission-vision-andcorevalues/ [https://perma.cc/C6PA-TMY9] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) ("The State Bar of
Arizona exists to serve and protect the public with respect to the provision of legal services and access to
justice."); About the State Bar of New Mexico, STATE BAR OF N.M., https://www.nmbar.org/nmstatebar/
AboutUs/Nmstatebar/AboutUs/Overview.aspx?hkey=17a9fflf-c7cc-4222-8b74-af5ac0ff0211
[https://perma.
cc/SY6U-5X6P] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) ("The mission of the State Bar is to be a united and inclusive
organization serving the legal profession and the public.").
128. See, e.g., Who We Are, supra note 126; R.I. Bar Ass'n Governance & Bylaws art. 4.2, 4.3, 8.5 (2018),
https://ribar.com/page.aspx?id=27 [https://perma.cc/SXW9-93VE].
129. See Terry, supra note 3, at 798-801.
130. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CAL., 2018 FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT 5
(Apr. 30, 2019), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/201 8_StateBarFinancialStatement_
Final_Report _and Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ29-TVH3]; Who We Are, supra note 126.
131. For example, the "purposes" of the Vermont Bar Association do not mention the public at all. See VT.
BAR ASS'N CONST. § I. The Delaware State Bar Association Bylaws mention the public only in the context of
concern about "the proper public conception of the profession." Del. State Bar Ass'n Bylaws art. 1, § 1.2
(2019); see also OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (stating only that the Association was formed, in
part, "to take positions on matters of public interest as deemed advisable").
132. For instance, while there are more than 73,000 active lawyers licensed in Illinois, the voluntary Illinois
State Bar Association has only about 28,000 members, including law students. See About the ISBA, ILL. STATE
BAR ASS'N, http://www.isba.org/about [https://perma.cc/F8R9-69LJ]; ILL. SUP. CT., ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
& DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT OF 2019, at 15 (2020), https://www.iardc.org/Annual
Report20l9.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4SS-6QTD]. In contrast, Delaware has 3062 active in-state lawyers and
590 active lawyers who work out of state. See E-mail from Lisa Dolph, Clerk of Del. Supreme Court, to Tonya
Johnson, Reference Librarian, Univ. of Conn. Law Sch. (Oct. 10, 2019, 10:04 EDT). The Delaware State Bar
Association has 3151 lawyer-members. See E-mail from LaTonya Tucker, Dir. of Bar Services & Membership,
Del. State Bar Ass'n, to Leslie C. Levin (Oct. 7,2019, 17:09 EDT).
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who are forced to belong to the organization 133-may be concerned that taking
positions unpopular with some members will fuel more lawsuits. Organizational
bylaws that require votes by the entire membership on regulatory proposals can
make it difficult for bar organizations to effect changes from the status quo.
III. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS VS. INSURANCE DISCLOSURE

'

LPL insurance is the primary-and often the only-way to compensate victims
of lawyer malpractice. Yet some lawyers oppose an insurance requirement
because they do not want to pay for it, among other reasons.13' LPL insurance is
not required in most U.S. jurisdictions, largely because the organized bar has not
supported such a requirement.13' Instead, the ABA has endorsed a weaker measure that only requires lawyers to make disclosures concerning their insurance
coverage. 136 As discussed below, disclosure is an inadequate substitute for an insurance requirement. Yet even disclosure is preferable to the approach in many
states, which do nothing to enable the public to identify uninsured lawyers.13
A. MANDATORY INSURANCE

The debate over whether lawyers should be required to carry LPL insurance
first arose in the 1970s. 138 At that time, legal malpractice claims increased
sharply, and it became harder-and more expensive-for lawyers to obtain LPL
insurance. 139 State bars in California, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin considered whether to require all lawyers to purchase malpractice insurance from
state insurance funds that would be created in an effort to lower insurance costs
and protect the public from uninsured lawyers. Only Oregon adopted this

133. See, e.g., MCKEAN, supra note 44, at 85-86; Smith, supra note 45, at 50; Marcia Coyle, US Supreme
Court Ruling Fuels Suits Challenging Mandatory Bar Fees, NAT'L L. J. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/2019/02/14/us-supreme-court-ruling-fuels-suits-challenging-mandatory-bar-fees/
[https://
perma.cc/46KQ-YDK9].
134. See Levin, supra note 24, at 1290-95.
135. But see In re Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 79, Order Denying Petition for Amendment to
Supreme Court Rule 79, ADKT 534 (Nev. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 2018) (denying the State Bar of Nevada's petition
to impose an insurance requirement).
136. See MODEL CT. RULE ON INS. DISCLOSURE (AM. BAR ASS'N 2004).
137. Some of the largest states that do not require either insurance or disclosure that a lawyer is uninsured
include Florida, New York, and Texas. ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2018), https://www.americanbar.

org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/chart implementation of mcrid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UB3D-EASY].
138. See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of
Economic Institutions,4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 308 (1997); Jerome B. Schultz, Ensured Insurance: Bars Look at
Mandatory Coverage, B. LEADER, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 18.
139. Cohen, supra note 138, at 307-08; Fredric L. Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 TEMPLE L.
REv. 1285, 1285-86, 1295 (1988); Mary Ann Galante, Malpractice Rates Zoom; Legal Insurance Crisis,
NAT'L L. J., June 3, 1985, at 19; John J. Lynch, The Insurance Panic for Lawyers, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 42,
43.
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approach. 140 In 1977, it required its lawyers in private practice to purchase insurance from its newly created Professional Liability Fund. 14 1 Since then, at least
eighteen states have considered the issue and declined to require private practitioners to carry LPL insurance. 142

The argument in favor is primarily grounded in public protection. Clients with
personal plight matters (e.g., personal injury, divorce, criminal) are usually represented by solo and small firm lawyers, who are the most likely to be uninsured. 143
If there is no insurance, plaintiffs' malpractice lawyers will almost never take on
the malpractice case. 14 4 This is because even if they prevail, the malpractice lawyers will not get paid their contingent fee because there is no money to pay the
judgment. Some uninsured lawyers lack other means to pay judgments against
them. If they have assets, they may have moved them into a family member's
name. 14 5 Moreover, as one lawyer explained, "[i]t does not make sense to
chase [uninsured] lawyers for their condos and BMWs. They will file for
bankruptcy. "146
Opponents of an insurance requirement claim there is no evidence that uninsured lawyers pose a significant problem for the public. 14 7 But in fact, there are
numerous cases in which uninsured lawyers cause significant harm for which
they do not compensate clients. 148 Opponents also argue that the cost of an LPL
insurance requirement would prevent some lawyers from practicing law. 14 9 In
fact, lawyers can purchase $100,000 per occurrence/$300,000 annual aggregate
coverage in most states for $3000 or less annually,150 although the premiums are

140. Goldfein, supra note 139, at 1296; Schultz, supranote 138, at 18.
141. About the PLF, OR. STATE BAR PROF'L LIABILITY FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/about-plf/overview.
html [https://perma.cc/RX7Z-STB9] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
142. See KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 21, at 38. Some state bars did, however, form bar-related (lawyerowned) mutual insurance companies to provide more affordable LPL insurance to lawyers. See Cohen, supra
note 138, at 308; Leslie C. Levin, Regulatorsat the Margins: The Impact of MalpracticeInsurers on Solo and
Small FirmLawyers, 49 CONN. L. REV. 553, 565 (2016).
143. See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text; Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, supra note 27, at
Ex. C.
144. See KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 21, at 148.
145. Levin, supra note 24, at 1316, 1324.
146. Id. at 1313; see also Wolfson, supra note 26 (quoting plaintiff's malpractice lawyer who noted that
some lawyers do not purchase insurance because they know "[t]hey can duck into bankruptcy court and protect
virtually everything, making it impossible to bring justice").
147. See Schultz, supra note 138, at 19; John Schlegelmilch, Insufficient Evidence to Support Mandatory
Malpractice Insurance Requirements, NEV. LAw., June 2000, at 9; Darrel Tillar Mason, Mandatory
Malpractice Insurance-It's Time to Call the Question, VA. ST. BAR (Aug. 4, 2008), http://www.vsb.org/
site/news/item/mandatory-malp-ins-080408 [https://perma.cc/RP68-FWGP].
148. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 24, at 1311-16 (describing cases in which clients were unable to recover);
Thomas G. Bousquet, It's Time for MandatoryMalpractice,TEX. LAw., Dec. 6, 1993, at 11.
149. See Cunitz, supra note 28, at 655-57; Glenn Fisher, Professional Liability Insurance CoverageViable Form of Self-Regulation or Simply Another Business Decision?,LPL ADVISORY, Fall 2002, at 1.
150. Levin, supra note 24, at 1320.
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considerably higher in a few jurisdictions and specialties. 151 This level of coverage would cover most claims.15' In Oregon, where insurance costs lawyers $3300
annually for $300,000/$300,000,153 the requirement has not reportedly created a
problem for lawyers. Idaho's recent experience requiring lawyers to carry LPL
insurance also suggests that lawyers who wished to practice in the state were able
to secure insurance.154

Another argument against an insurance requirement-that it would force some
uninsured lawyers who provide pro bono and low-cost legal services to raise their
rates or discontinue their pro bono work 155-appears overstated. A survey of New
Mexico uninsured lawyers revealed that less than 18% performed any pro bono
work, and it was unclear how much of that work was for persons of limited
means. 156 For lawyers who exclusively perform pro bono work, this problem can
be addressed by exempting them from purchasing insurance if they work through
bar-approved pro bono programs that provide insurance coverage to volunteer lawyers.1 57 While there may still be a small number of lawyers who serve low-income

populations, charge very little, and cannot afford LPL insurance, their clients might
instead be afforded some protection through a client malpractice fund. 158
Finally, the claim by some opponents that an insurance requirement would
enable insurance companies, and not the courts, to determine who can practice
law15 9 is vastly overstated. There are multiple insurance companies in every state
151. For example, the average cost of comparable coverage for New Jersey lawyers in solo and two-person
firms is about $4100. E-mail from Mike Mooney, Senior Vice President, Prof'l Liab. Practice Leader, USI
Affinity, to Leslie C. Levin (July 9, 2018, 8:45 EDT) (on file with the author).
152. In Missouri, the mean claim payment for solo lawyers was $52,678 and the median payment was
$24,351. KRITZER & VIDMAR, supra note 21, at 114. For law firms of two to five lawyers, the mean paid was
$110,994 and the median payment was $34,034. Id.
153. Coverage, OR. STATE BAR PROF'L LIABILITY FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/coverage/overview.html
[https://perma.cc/TX9P-MB6B] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
154. See Leslie C. Levin, When Lawyers Screw Up, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 109, 123 (2019). Of course,
there are some states in which LPL insurance premiums are higher than in Idaho or Oregon.
155. See Alan Cooper, VSB Sinks MandatoryInsurance, VA. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 27, 2008; Jill Sunby, What
Montana Lawyers Think About Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, MONT. LAW, Aug. 2001, at 25; James C.
Gallagher, Should Lawyers Be Required to Disclose Whether They Have Malpractice Insurance?,32 VT. B. J.
5 (2006).
156. See Levin, supra note 24, at 1321 n.220.
157. Oregon lawyers are exempted from purchasing insurance if they are exclusively providing pro bono
services for Oregon State Bar certified pro bono programs. Exemptions-Annual and Midyear, OR. STATE BAR
PROF'L LIABILITY FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/assessment-exemptions/exemptions.html/ [https://perma.cc/
PMZ8-G54V] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). Idaho lawyers may also obtain an exemption when they are
exclusively providing pro bono services through the Idaho Volunteer Lawyers Program. See Annette Strauser,
2018 MalpracticeCoverageRequirement: GeneralInformation, IDAHO STATE BAR, https://isb.idaho.gov/blog/
author/astrauser/ [https://perma.cc/72CH-XJGV] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020); E-mail from Susan R. Pierson,
Dir., Idaho Volunteer Lawyers Program (July 30, 2018, 14:14 EDT) (on file with author).
158. If a malpractice claims fund were formed to compensate the victims of uninsured lawyers, low-income
uninsured lawyers could, in lieu of purchasing LPL insurance, be required to contribute a lesser sum annually
to a malpractice claims fund. See Levin, supra note 154, at 122.
159. See Mason, supra note 147; Cunitz, supra note 28, at 657; Fisher, supra note 149, at 1; Schultz, supra
note 138, at 19.
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that will write insurance for solo and small firm lawyers.160 Only a small number
of uninsured lawyers report they cannot obtain coverage. 161 If states require lawyers to purchase LPL insurance and those lawyers cannot obtain it, they can seek
to join law firms that provide insurance. They can also work in other settings
(e.g., the government, in-house) where insurance coverage is not required.16 2
And, of course, if insurance rates were to rise precipitously or the insurance market tightens significantly, states could revisit the insurance requirement.
B. INSURANCE DISCLOSURE

Instead of an LPL insurance requirement, many states have settled on some version of an insurance disclosure requirement. Some states began to adopt disclosure
requirements in the 1990s, and in 2002, the ABA proposed an amendment to the
Model Rules that would require lawyers to directly disclose to their clients whether
they maintain LPL insurance.163 The proposal was later withdrawn due to bar opposition." In 2004, the ABA instead adopted a weaker Model Court Rule on
Insurance Disclosure, which requires lawyers to disclose whether they carry LPL
insurance on their annual registration forms and provides for courts to determine
how to make this information available to the public. 16 Twenty-three states
have adopted some type of disclosure requirement. The seven states with the
strongest disclosure rules require uninsured lawyers to disclose directly to their
clients-in writing-that they do not carry LPL insurance ("direct disclosure").166
Nine states require that the insurance information be posted on state bar or judicial

160. See, e.g., WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, MANDATORY MALPRACTICE INS. TASK FORCE, REPORT TO WSBA

BOARD OF GOVERNORS 77 (Feb. 2019), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legal-community/
committee s/mandatory-malpractice-insurance-task-force/mandatory-malpractice-insurance-task-force-report.
pdf?sfvrsn=558e03f1_0 [https://perma.cc/3NN5-X3Z5] (noting a large number of admitted carriers in
Washington).
161. In surveys in Nevada, New Mexico, and New Jersey, five or fewer lawyers in each of those states indicated that the main reason they were uninsured was because they could not obtain coverage or their claims
experiences were unacceptable. See Levin, supra note 24, at 1293 (describing results of New Mexico survey);
Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, ADKT 534, supra note 27, Ex. C, at 5; REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT
AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, June 2017, at app. Z, at 10, https://www.njcourts.
gov/courts/assets/supreme/reports/2017/attmalpracticeinsurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZ9V-ZWNY]. It is
unclear in some of those cases whether the lawyers truly could not obtain coverage or whether they simply
could not afford it at the price at which it was offered.
162. In Oregon, only private practitioners are required to carry insurance. OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080(2)(a)(A)
(2018). In Idaho, in-house counsel are required to maintain insurance, but coverage may be purchased by the
corporate employer. See, e.g., Make sure your in-house attorneys areproperly insured, THE HARTFORD (2013),
https://houstonbusinessinsurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Hartford-Employed-Lawyer-LiabilityBrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7T4-YYTY].
163. ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION REPORT 2 (Aug. 2004).

164. See id.
165. MODEL CT. RULE ON INS. DISCLOSURE preface (AM. BAR ASS'N 2004).

166. These states are Alaska, California, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota. ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT

RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE, supra note 137. Pennsylvania also posts the information on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Disciplinary Board website. Id.
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websites ("website disclosure"). 167 Seven other states adopted very weak disclosure
rules, requiring lawyers to disclose whether they are insured on attorney registration forms, but only making this information available to the public if they call or
write to regulators-or not disclosing this information at all ("weak disclosure").168
The arguments in favor of insurance disclosure primarily are grounded in public
protection and in the view that under the rules of professional conduct, insurance
coverage is a material fact about which a client should be informed before retaining a lawyer.16 9 Proponents also hoped it would encourage uninsured lawyers to
purchase insurance. 170 The evidence is inconclusive as to whether it actually does
so. 171 It is also doubtful that the current disclosure regimes do much to inform clients. In direct disclosure states, clients may never read the information provided
by uninsured lawyers. 17 2 As Omri Ben Shahar and Carl Schneider note, there is

substantial evidence that "people often overlook disclosures, ignore them when
they notice them, [and] treat them perfunctorily when they read them." 173 Even if
clients read the disclosure, it is unlikely they fully understand the implications of
lawyers being uninsured. 174 Clients may assume these lawyers have other assets if
they need to sue.17 5 Moreover, the timing of direct disclosure is problematic.
167. Id. Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Virginia, Washington, and West
Virginia post the information on websites.
168. In Delaware, Kansas, Nevada, North Dakota, and Rhode Island the public can obtain this information
by contacting state authorities. Hawaii and Michigan collect the information but will not disclose it to the public. Levin, supranote 24, at 1300.
169. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION REPORT, supra note 163, at 2; Susan Saab
Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 196 (2012);
Nicole D. Mignone, The Emperor's New Clothes? Cloaking Client Protection Under the New Model Court
Rule on Insurance Disclosure, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1069, 1072, 1081 (2005); Jeffrey D. Watters, What They
Don't Know Can Hurt Them: Why Clients Should Know If Their Attorney Does Not Carry Malpractice
Insurance, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 245, 247 (2010).
170. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Under Covered, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 47, 48; Jason Mil, New Rule Would
Require Attorney Disclosures Regarding Malpractice Coverage, J. ALLEGHENY COUNTY B. ASS'N, Sept. 2005,
at 7, 7.
171. Memorandum from James E. Towery, Chair, Ins. Disclosure Task Force, to Members of the California
State Bar Bd. of Governors, Sept. 14, 2007, at 9; Levin, supra note 24, at 1303-07.
172. This is especially true in jurisdictions that do not require written acknowledgement from clients. See,
e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(c) (2018).
173. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 67 (2014). Mandated disclosures fail to inform even when disclosure occurs under
"ideal circumstances" and when people should be attending to the information because it involves life-anddeath matters. Id. at 42-53.
174. For example, in Ohio, the notice to clients states: "Pursuant to Rule 1.4 of the Ohio Rules of
Professional Conduct, I am required to notify you that I do not maintain professional liability (malpractice) insurance of at least $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate." OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.4(c) (2018). This notice does not clearly convey that the lawyer may carry no LPL insurance whatsoever
or that the lawyer may be unable to satisfy a malpractice judgment as a result.
175. See, e.g., LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH

FINDINGS 18 (2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/
public perception of lawyers 2002.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/48H9-2T3E] (noting that the public
believes that law careers are lucrative); David O'Boyle & Michael Smith, Survey Reveals Public Perceptions of
Lawyers and Legal Profession, WASH. LAW. (Apr. 2015), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/
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Direct disclosure is typically not required until the client engages the lawyer. 176
Time constraints, social norms, and power imbalances may make it difficult for a
client to change course once the client has orally agreed to hire the lawyer.177
States that disclose a lawyer's lack of insurance coverage on websites theoretically enable clients to obtain this information before they contact a lawyer, but
clients are unlikely to do so. Many solo and small firm lawyers obtain new clients
through word of mouth. 178 Clients are less likely to perform extensive online
research if a lawyer has been personally recommended. Even clients who perform
an internet search may not consider checking whether a lawyer carries LPL insurance because the public generally believes that lawyers are required to maintain
insurance. 17 9 Members of the public are also unlikely to know they can check a
state court or state bar website to learn whether a lawyer maintains LPL insurance. This information typically does not appear when a lawyer's name is input
into an internet search engine (e.g., Google). Even if individuals find the information, the potential implications of a lawyer being uninsured are not explained.180
Consequently, insurance disclosure rules do not enable the public to engage in
truly informed decisionmaking with respect to the risks of hiring an uninsured
lawyer. They are an inadequate substitute for mandatory LPL insurance.
IV. THE POLITICS OF LAWYER MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: CASE STUDIES

This Part describes the circumstances under which some states have
considered-and even adopted-public-regarding laws concerning LPL insurance. It starts with Oregon, which adopted an insurance requirement more than
forty years ago. 181 It then looks at six states that more recently considered the

washington-lawyer/articles/april-2015-legal-beat.cfm [https://perma.cc/7XD8-WUG3] (reporting that nearly
half of respondents think lawyers are rich).
176. The exception may be South Dakota, as lawyers there must include this information in advertising. See
S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(d), 7.2(1) (2019).
177. Cognitive biases may also make it difficult for a client to change course once a decision to retain a lawyer is made. Levin, supra note 24, at 1326-27.
178. See CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-

FIRM ATTORNEYS 139-40 (1996); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs' Lawyers: Dealing with the
Possible but Not Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REv. 337, 366 (2011).
179. See Nancy McCarthy, Bar Board Will Tackle Malpractice Insurance Disclosure Again, CAL. B.J.,
Nov. 2007; State by State, Mandatory Malpractice Disclosure Gathers Steam, B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 2004.
Indeed, I have spoken with many lawyers who were surprised to learn that lawyers in private practice are not
required to maintain LPL insurance.
180. For example, the Washington State Bar Association website states that not all lawyers maintain LPL insurance and that "[s]ome lawyers may make a responsible decision not to maintain insurance because ... the lawyer may choose to be financially responsible (self-insured)." Professional Liability Insurance, WASH. STATE BAR
ASS'N, https://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/license-renewal/icense-renewal-faqs/professional-liabilityinsurance [https://perma.cc/V87V-HJ32] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). This statement may suggest to the public that
they need not be concerned about uninsured lawyers because those lawyers will "self-insure."
181. Ideally, case studies should compare cases that occurred more or less contemporaneously. For the sake of
completeness, however, and because the experience in Oregon is also instructive, it is included in the discussion.
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insurance issue: California, Idaho, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington.18 2
Idaho imposed an insurance requirement. California, Nevada, and Washington have
disclosure requirements and recently considered requiring LPL insurance. New
Jersey considered both approaches and seemingly settled upon a weak disclosure
requirement. Texas never considered mandatory insurance and declined to adopt a
disclosure rule. 183 The states' consideration of the lawyer malpractice insurance
issue is used as a lens through which to examine when some states will adopt public-regarding laws and when others will instead protect lawyers' interests.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the number of western states that
have recently focused on the insurance issue may not be coincidental. States (and
regions) are culturally and politically different. 18 4 Political culture shapes government, institutions, processes, and policies in a variety of ways. 185 Daniel Elazar
identified three dominant cultures within the United States, which he labeled moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic. 186 Each is tied to specific areas of the
country due to migration streams that carried people of different backgrounds
across the country. 187 In the moralistic political culture, which is found in Oregon
and some other Western states, politics is viewed as a positive activity in which
citizens have an obligation to participate, and "[g]ood government is measured
by the degree to which it promotes the public good." 188 Moralistic states have
higher levels of political participation and are more likely to adopt political
reforms and innovations. 189 Individualistic political culture, which is associated
with some of the Rocky Mountain, Midwest, and Mid-Atlantic states, is based on
a more utilitarian view that politics should work like a marketplace and places
a premium on limiting government intervention into private activities.1 90
182. Georgia is also considering an insurance requirement, but its deliberations have not concluded. See
E-mail from Paula Frederick, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Ga., to Leslie C. Levin (June 10, 2020, 19:12 EDT)
(on file with author). In 2017, Illinois adopted a requirement that uninsured lawyers must complete a four-hour
on-line assessment of their firm's operations. See Matthew Hector, New Rule Requires Uninsured Lawyers to
do Self-Assessment, ILL. B.J., Mar. 2017, at 22.
183. Texas decided the issue in 2010, less recently than the other states considered here. It is included for geographic diversity and because it is a large state with a state bar that is subject by law to some legislative oversight.
184. ANDREW GELMAN, RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE 20-23 (2008).
185. See, e.g., Joel Lieske, The ChangingRegional Subcultures of the American States and the Utility of a
New CulturalMeasure, 63 POL. RES. Q. 538, 538 (2010). Political culture is distinct from political ideology.
States of any of the three subcultures can be liberal or conservative. For example, Utah and Minnesota are both
moralistic states. Daniel J. Elazar, Minnesota-The Epitome of the MoralisticPolitical Culture, in MINNESOTA
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (Daniel J. Elazar et al. eds., 1999).
186. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 115 (3d ed. 1984). He also la-

beled some states as "moralistic/individualistic" (meaning closer to moralistic), "individualistic/moralistic"
(meaning closer to individualistic), etc. Id. at 136-37.
187. Patrick I. Fisher, Definitely Not Moralistic: State Political Culture and Support for Donald Trump in
the Race for the 2016 Republican Presidential Nomination, 49 POL. SCI. & POL. 743, 744 (2016).
188. Id. at 744.
189. Id.; David R. Morgan & Sheilah S. Watson, PoliticalCulture, PoliticalSystem Characteristics, and
Public PoliciesAmong the American States, 21 PUBLIUS 31, 34-35 (1991).
190. Patrick Fisher, State PoliticalCulture and Support for Obama in the 2008 Democratic Presidential
Primaries,47 SOC. SCI. J. 699, 702-03 (2010).
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"Traditionalistic" political culture, found mostly in the South, 191 accepts the
inevitability of a hierarchical society and tries to limit the role of government to
maintaining the existing social order. 1 92 While the political cultures are changing
in some regions, 193 they have proved to be a good predictor of public policy variations among the states. 194 They by no means, however, provide a complete explanation of when states will adopt public-regarding laws.
This Part begins with states that have adopted LPL insurance requirements and
then considers states that have afforded less protection (i.e., disclosure requirements), or none at all. A chart depicting some of the differences among the states
appears below.
STATE
State

BY

STATE COMPARISON: LPL INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

Active

Type of

Lawyer

State Bar

Political Culture

Current Approach

Most Recent Action

to Issue

Pop.

Or.

14,000195

Mandatory

Moralistic

Mandatory
insurance

Legislature adopted
insurance requirement

proposed by Bar (1977)
Idaho

5076196

Mandatory

Moralistic/

Mandatory

Court adopted insurance

Individualistic

insurance

requirement proposed by

Bar (2017)
Cal.

189,81497

Mandatory

Moralistic/

Direct disclosure

Individualistic

to clients

Bar reached no conclusion
about insurance
requirement; recommended
adding website disclosure

(2019)

191. Lawrence M. Mead, State Political Culture and Welfare Reform, 32 POL'Y STUD. J. 271, 275 (2004).
192. Fisher, supra note 190, at 702.
193. See, e.g., id. at 703; Lieske, supra note 185, at 548.
194. C. David Moon et al., Political Culture in the Urban West: Is It Really Different?, 33 STATE & LOC.
GOv'T REv. 195, 195 (2001).
195. About the Oregon State Bar, OR. STATE BAR, https://www.osbar.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/
V83E-V5RN] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). In 1977, when the Oregon State Bar proposed legislation authorizing
the Professional Liability Fund, there were about 5000 members of the State Bar and 3500 lawyers in private
practice. See Carl R. Neil, Report to the Membership, OR. ST. B. BULL., Mar. 1977, at 5; John D. Ryan,
Growing Pains: Recollections of the 1977 OSB Specialization Controversy, OR. STATE BAR (Aug.-Sept.
2002), https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/02augsep/heritage.html [https://perma.cc/B744-KZ6K].
196. Membership Count & Statuses, IDAHO STATE BAR, https://isb.idaho.gov/licensing-mcle/membershipcount-statuses/ [https://perma.cc/AJ7G-DQML] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). The membership, including judges,
in-house counsel, senior, and emeritus members is 5670. Id.
197. Demographics, STATE BAR OF CAL. (2019), https://members.calbar.ca.gov/search/demographics.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3XPY-XFEP]. This number excludes judges.
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Most Recent Action

to Issue

Pop.

Wash.

32,189198

Mandatory

Moralistic/

Website

Individualistic

disclosure

Bar rejected insurance
requirement (2019); public
interest group now proposing

requirement (2020)
Nev.

9056199

Mandatory

Individualistic

Disclosure upon
call or email
inquiry to Bar

N.J.

98,657200

Voluntary

Individualistic

Court rejected Bar's
recommendation to require
insurance (2018)

Website

Court accepted task force

disclosure of

recommendation against

insured lawyers

insurance requirement;

planned

agreed to some website

disclosure (2019)
Tex.

103,342201

Mandatory

Traditionalistic/

Generally

Individualistic

unregulated

Court accepted Bar's
recommendation against
disclosure (2010); did not
consider insurance
requirement

A. OREGON

As Tom Lininger has noted, Oregon "has distinguished itself from the other
forty-nine states in many areas of the law," being the first in the nation to pass a
bottle bill, the first to establish a statewide system of land planning, the first to
permit physician-assisted suicide, and the first to create a near-universal system

198. WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, MANDATORY MALPRACTICE INS. TASK FORCE, REPORT TO WSBA BOARD

OF GOVERNORS, supra note 160, at 8. Of the lawyers licensed to practice in Washington in 2017, 19,813 were
private practitioners. Id.
199. STATE BAR OF NEV., ANNUAL REPORT 2018 (2019), https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/SBNAnnualReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7CP-KTFK].
200. See OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS, 2018 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM REPORT 59
(2019), https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2018oaeannualrpt.pdf?c=qY5
[https://perma.cc/EM4J74YN]. In December 2018, there were 37,006 lawyers engaged in private practice in New Jersey. Id. at 62.
201. STATE BAR OF TEX., MEMBERSHIP: ATTORNEY STATISTICAL PROFILE (2018-2019), https://www.
texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=ContentFolders&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentI
D=43800 [https://perma.cc/L5DC-RQM5].
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of health insurance. 20 2 It is therefore not surprising that Oregon was the first-and
for many years the only-state to require lawyers to maintain LPL insurance.
Nevertheless, Oregon's decision in the 1970s to require insurance was unusual for
two reasons. First, the Oregon Supreme Court did not play a significant role in the
adoption of the requirement. Second, the insurance proposal was initiated byand drew broad support from-the Oregon State Bar ("OSB").
The justices of the seven-member Oregon Supreme Court are elected in nonpartisan elections to six-year terms. 2 3 The Court claims the inherent authority to
regulate lawyers under the state constitution, but it recognizes the state legislature
can also engage in lawyer regulation as long as it does not unduly burden the
court's judicial functions. 20 4 In 1935, the legislature created the mandatory OSB
as a public corporation. 2 5 The OSB helps to administer lawyer admissions and
discipline in the state. 206 Its Board of Governors, with the approval of the State
Bar's House of Delegates, has the statutory power to formulate rules of professional conduct for adoption by the Supreme Court. 207 The Court does not "formulate" rule changes, but justices sometimes work with OSB committees that draft
proposed amendments.208
By 1970, many LPL insurance underwriters in Oregon had pulled out of the
market or were considering eliminating coverage. 20 9 The OSB sent a questionnaire to 725 members and found that 84% of respondents favored a bar-sponsored
plan for LPL insurance that would be mandatory for all private practitioners. 2 10
Almost 40% reported that their LPL insurance premiums had increased and 10%
indicated that their insurers were showing reluctance to renew coverage. 21 At the
OSB's request following its 1972 Annual Meeting, the Oregon legislature
amended the Oregon Bar Act in 1973 to authorize a mandatory professional
liability program. 212 The OSB's members voted at its 1976 Annual Meeting to
seek legislation authorizing the creation of a Professional Liability Fund and

202. Tom Lininger, Should Oregon Adopt the New ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct?, 39
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1031, 1031-32 (2003).
203. Oregon Blue Book, OR. SUPREME COURT, https://sos.oregon.gov/blue-book/Pages/state/judicial/
supreme.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HRW-32RB].
204. See, e.g., Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Or. 1976); Roy Pulvers, Separationof
Powers Under the Oregon Constitution:A User's Guide, 75 OR. L. REv. 443, 457 (1996).
205. Edwin J. Peterson, Lawyer-Client Conflicts of Interest Law: Contributionsof Chief Justice Wallace P.
Carson, Jr. During a Time of Dynamic Change, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 527, 528, 537 (2007).
206. OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010(2) (2017); About the Oregon State Bar, supra note 195.
207. OR. REV. STAT. § 9.490(1) (2017).
208. See Peterson, supra note 205, at 527-28,535.
209. 1970 COMMITTEE REPORTS: THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE OREGON STATE BAR,
PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE RECOMMENDATION 226 (1970).

210. Insurance Survey, OR. ST. B. BULL., April 1970, at 23. Of the 725 questionnaires returned, 605 lawyers
favored such an arrangement, 34 opposed it, and 86 were undecided. Id.
211. Id.
212. Oregon State Bar Statement of the Board of Governors Professional Liability Fund, 1977 Annual
Meeting, at 1.
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require all lawyers to purchase insurance from it. 213 The Oregon legislature
enacted such legislation in 1977.214 That same year, the OSB passed a resolution
establishing the OSB Professional Liability Fund ("PLF"). 21 5 The initial sixmonth assessment for a $100,000/$200,000 claims-made policy was $250.216
The OSB viewed the benefits of mandatory insurance to include "greater protection to the clients and the public." 21 7 Yet as Manuel Ramos observed, "[a]ltruism, or concern for the consumer, was not entirely behind Oregon's decision
establishing PLF.''2 1 8 By the mid-1970s, claims against lawyers had increased
"dramatically," only two commercial insurers wrote LPL coverage in Oregon,
and Oregon lawyers paid "among the highest premiums in the country. "219
Oregon lawyers may have believed that the OSB's assessment of $250 for six
months-which was below the amount many lawyers were paying private insurers for LPL insurance 22 0-would continue to be lower than if it were purchased in
the commercial market. Moreover, as one member of the OSB Board of
Governors observed:
[T]he importance of being covered by our own Fund cannot be overstated. It is
a fund which is created by ourselves, governed by ourselves, for the protection
of ourselves, and which relieves us of being bound to a commercial insurer.
We now can control our own destiny regarding costs and coverage... 221
B. IDAHO

While Idaho and Oregon share a border, they differ politically and demographically. 222 The five-member Idaho Supreme Court is elected in non-partisan
elections for six-year terms. 223 It is not known as an activist court and typically

213. Id. at 2-3.
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Professional Liability FundReport Due at Convention, OR. ST. B. BULL., 1977, at 6.
218. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice:Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors,70 TUL. L. REV. 2583,
2610 (1996).
219. Oregon State Bar Statement of the Board of Governors, supranote 212, at 2.
220. Cunitz, supra note 28, at 652.
221. Daniel O'Leary, The Professional Liability Fund: Milestone, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 1978, at 9.
222. Oregon is somewhat more ethnically diverse than Idaho, but both states are predominantly comprised
of Caucasians. QuickFacts United States -Idaho, Oregon, Washington, U.S. CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US,ID,OR,WA/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/A859-6Q97]. Idaho is 18% Mormon,
making it the state with the highest percentage of Mormons after Utah. The Religiously Distinct States of
America, GALLUP (Feb. 9, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/226844/religiously-segregated-states-america.
aspx [https://perma.cc/KM59-6MGY]. Oregon has voted Democratic since 1988. PresidentialElection in
Oregon, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_electioninOregon,_2020 [https://perma.cc/
V5YM-HFAN]. Idaho voters have consistently favored Republicans since the 1960s. See Adam Cotterell, How
Idaho Became A One Party State, BOISE PUB. RADIO (May 13, 2014), https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/
post/how-idaho-became-one-party-state#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/59ZL-MKZX].
223. CHARLES

S. LOPEMAN,

THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE 88 (1999).
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recognizes the legislature as the state's main policymaker. 224 Nevertheless, the
Court claims the inherent authority to regulate admission to the legal profession,
and while noting that the legislature may "enact valid laws in aid of [judicial]
functions," it has rejected legislative efforts to relax certain bar admission
requirements. 225 Idaho's legislature is part-time 2 26 and rarely attempts to regulate

the practice of law.
Proposals for rule changes relating to lawyer regulation almost always come
from the mandatory Idaho State Bar ("ISB"), 22 1 which was formed by the state
legislature in 1923.228 The ISB currently has more than 5000 active members, 229
and is a "self-governing state agency" with responsibility for the administration
of lawyer admission and discipline. 230 Its governing body, the Board of
Commissioners, consists of five commissioners elected for three-year terms.231
The Board of Commissioners has the authority to determine the requirements for
admission to practice, subject to a vote of ISB members and the approval of the
Supreme Court. 2 32 The commissioners and a representative from each of the
ISB's seven district bar associations meet in October to vote on whether to circulate resolutions to the membership for a vote.233 In November, the commissioners
then embark on a "road show" during which they meet with each district bar association to discuss the proposed resolutions before the membership vote, which
concludes in December. 234

224. Id. at 87-88, 100.
225. In re Kaufman, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (Idaho 1949) (finding that the legislature could set minimum, but
not maximum, requirements for bar admission); see also State v. McCoy, 486 P.2d 247, 252 (Idaho 1971) (noting "that control and administration of the organized Bar had always been recognized as a function peculiar to
the judiciary").
226. The Idaho legislature convenes in early January and typically adjourns in late March or early April.
IDAHO LEGIS. SESSION DATES, https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/sessiondates/ [https://perma.cc/9A6XJXDF]. Its members earn less than $7500 annually. Idaho State Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.
org/IdahoStateLegislature [https://perma.cc/LGW7-NZPK].
227. There has only been one instance in more than thirty-five years in which the Supreme Court has initiated a rule change. Telephone Interview with Diane Minnich, Exec. Dir., Idaho State Bar (May 11, 2018).
228. About Us, IDAHO STATE BAR, https://isb.idaho.gov/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/RN8B-EXZA] (last
visited May 26, 2020) [hereinafter Idaho About Us]. Some lawyers asked the legislature to form the ISB. For a
discussion of the legislation and opposition to it by some lawyer-legislators, see Jess B. Hawley, Bar
Integrationin Idaho, J. AM. JUD. SOC. 141, 142 (1931).
229. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
230. Idaho About Us, supra note 228.
231. Board of Commissioners, IDAHO STATE BAR, https://isb.idaho.gov/about-us/governance/boc/ [https://
perma.cc/SH5Y-4D9D].
232. IDAHO CODE § 3-408 (2018); IDAHO BAR COMM'N RULES R. 906(a) (2019). Any bar member can recommend changes to the rules of the Bar by proposing a resolution. IDAHO BAR COMM'N RULES R. 906(b)
(2019).
233. IDAHO BAR COMM'N RULES R. 905(b), 906(b) (2019).
234. Resolution Process (aka Roadshow), IDAHO STATE BAR, https://isb.idaho.gov/about-us/governance/
resolution-process/ [https://perma.cc/2ETQ-GHC5].
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In 1993, the ISB's membership passed a resolution directing its commissioners
to study the feasibility of mandatory LPL insurance and to submit a proposal. 2 35
The commissioners then formed a Malpractice Task Force, which in 1994 recommended the creation of the professional liability fund to which all active ISB
members would be required to contribute for insurance coverage. 2 3 6 The proposal

met some opposition and the Task Force withdrew it to consider an opt-out provision for government lawyers, in-house counsel, and part-time lawyers. 23 7 In
1995, the ISB's Board of Commissioners voted to sponsor resolutions that would
require lawyers to maintain LPL insurance provided through a bar-sponsored pro239
gram.238 The ISB's members rejected the resolutions by a 67-451 vote.
In 2005, in response to the ABA's adoption of the Model Court Rule on
Insurance Disclosure, the Board of Commissioners proposed amendments to the
Bar Commission Rules requiring lawyers to certify to the ISB whether they carried LPL insurance. 240 The ISB bar members approved the resolution 241 and in
2006, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a rule requiring lawyers to disclose to
regulators whether they maintained LPL insurance. 242 The information was not
posted on the ISB website, but the public could contact the ISB to learn whether a
lawyer was insured.243
The issue of mandatory LPL insurance again arose in late 2015. An ISB commissioner raised the question of whether to propose a rule requiring lawyers to
carry a minimum amount of LPL coverage.24 4 She did so because she had
recently represented a client whose former lawyer committed malpractice, but
was uninsured. 245 The commissioners researched the experiences in other states
and talked with insurers. 246 In October 2016, the commissioners and district bar
presidents approved a resolution to require lawyers who represent private clients
to submit proof of LPL coverage in the minimum amount of $100,000/

235. Jeffrey M. Wilson, President's Message: Mandatory Malpractice Insurance is Feasible, THE
ADVOCATE, Sept. 1994, at 6.

236. Id.
237. Jeffrey M. Wilson, President'sMessage: MandatoryMalpractice Insurance- The Debate Continues,
THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 1994, at 6, 16.
238. Board of Commissioners Meeting Review, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 1995, at 35; Andrew Schwam,
MandatoryMalpractice InsuranceResolutions Should Be Defeated, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 1995, at 4; Fifteen
Resolutions Will be Presentedat '95 Roadshow, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 1995, at 9.
239. Diane K. Minnich, 1995 ResolutionResults, THE ADVOCATE, Jan. 1996, at 6.
240. IDAHO BD. OF COMM'RS, Resolution 05-1 (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Diane
Minnich, supra note 227.
241. Diane K. Minnich, Executive DirectorReport, 2005 Resolutions - The Results, THE ADVOCATE, Jan.
2006, at 6.
242. See IDAHO BAR COMM'N RULES R. 304(a)(4) (2007).
243. See Telephone Interview with Annette Strauser, MCLE & IT Adm'r, Idaho State Bar (May 22, 2015).
244. Telephone Interview with Diane Minnich, supranote 227.
245. Telephone Interview with Michelle Points, former president, ISB (May 8, 2018).
246. Id.
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$300,000.247 The proposal contemplated that lawyers would purchase LPL insurance on the open market.
A six-page voter pamphlet mailed to ISB members in mid-October described
the resolution in a single paragraph that focused on the issue of public protection.248 During the November road show, lawyers were split on the resolution in
the district meetings, but no organized opposition emerged. 249 Ballots were due
by December 5, 2016.250 The resolution passed by a vote of 51-49%, with less
than 25% of the active members voting.2 51 The Board of Commissioners then
proposed the rule changes to the Idaho Supreme Court, which had not previously
been involved in the initiative. 252 The Supreme Court adopted the new rule with
non-substantive amendments, and it became effective on January 1, 2018.253
Why was the ISB able to effect this significant rule change? The percentage of
uninsured Idaho lawyers at the time of the vote may have been low. 25 4 Moreover,
the idea of an insurance requirement may not have seemed radical to Idaho lawyers. Idaho attorneys could obtain reciprocity to practice in Oregon without taking a bar exam,25 5 but were required to obtain LPL insurance to be licensed
there. 256 In addition, prior to the road show, there was no task force report that
might have attracted attention. There was limited media coverage of the issue
during the short time period between the Board of Commissioners' October 2016
approval of the resolution and the membership's vote on the resolution.2 7
Consequently, there was limited opportunity to mount any organized opposition
before the vote. Nor was there a mechanism for disgruntled lawyers to appeal
directly to the Supreme Court thereafter. The simplicity of the proposal also may
have helped, because unlike the 1995 proposal, it did not involve the creation of a
247. Idaho State Bar Bd. of Comm'rs, General Session Minutes, Oct. 6, 2016; Idaho State Bar, 2016
Resolution Process: Res. 16-02, at 6, https://isb.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016_voter pamphlet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/US89-CBJC] [hereinafter Idaho State Bar, 2016 Resolution Process]. Two voted against the
proposal and one abstained. Idaho State Bar Bd. of Comm'rs, General Session Minutes, supra.
248. Idaho State Bar, 2016 Resolution Process, supra note 247, at 6 (noting that "[r]equiring attorneys to
have minimum limits of professional liability insurance coverage would help to ensure the public as consumers
of legal services are financially protected from attorney error").
249. Telephone Interview with Michelle Points, supra note 245.
250. Idaho State Bar, 2016 Resolution Process, supra note 247, at 1.
251. See Diane K. Minnich, 2016 Resolution Process- The Results, THE ADVOCATE, Jan. 2017, at 22.
252. Telephone Interview with Michelle Points, supra note 245.
253. In re Amendments to the Sections of the Idaho Bar Comm'n Rules, Amended Order, Mar. 30, 2017.
254. A survey conducted in 2016 of all ISB members indicates that about 9% of Idaho lawyers were uninsured. See 2016 Idaho State Bar Membership Survey 38, https://isb.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2016_isbmembership _survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5NK-A3YJ].
255. The Northwest Tri-State Compact among Washington, Oregon, and Idaho became effective in 2002
and enabled lawyers to gain reciprocal admission after three years of continuous practice in one of the states.
See Mark J. Fucile, Reciprocity, In-House Counsel Admissions and Multi-Jurisdiction Practice in Washington
(and Beyond) 6-4-6-5 (2015). The required period of practice is now five years. OR. RULES FOR ADMISSION OF
ATTORNEYS 15.05(1) (2019).
256. OR. RULES FOR ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS 15.05(6) (2019).
257. The only discussion appeared in the Idaho Bar Association's magazine, which briefly announced that
there would be a vote on the resolution. See News Briefs, THE ADVOCATE, Nov.-Dec. 2016, at 18-19.

1002

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 33:969

state professional liability fund.258 The relatively low cost of LPL insurance in
Idaho also probably helped with passage. 259 Finally, Idaho's "moralistic/individualistic" political culture 2 0 may have contributed to the result.
C. CALIFORNIA

California's experience with the insurance issue is lengthier and more complicated. Like Idaho, its political culture is "moralistic/individualistic." 2 61 The seven
justices of the California Supreme Court are initially appointed by the governor, 2 62
confirmed by the voters during the next general election, and subject to retention
votes thereafter.2 63 The Court claims the inherent and exclusive power to control
lawyer admission and discipline. 2 " Yet it accedes to the legislature's exercise,
under its police power, of a "reasonable degree of regulation and control over the
profession and the practice of law.'' 2 65 In fact, as explained below, the California
legislature exercises an unusual degree of control over the State Bar.
The State Bar of California is a mandatory bar, formed in 1927 by the
California legislature as an arm of the California Supreme Court.266 The requirement that lawyers belong to the State Bar is now enshrined in the state constitution.267 The State Bar has almost 190,000 active lawyer members. 268 The State
Bar's governing body, the thirteen-member Board of Trustees, is composed of
seven attorneys appointed by the state Supreme Court and the legislature, and six
non-attorney members. 269 Changes to the rules of professional conduct can be
formulated by the State Bar Board of Trustees but must be approved by the
California Supreme Court.270

258. See Telephone Interview with Diane Minnich, supra note 227.
259. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, MANDATORY

MALPRACTICE INS. TASK FORCE, REPORT TO WSBA

BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 160, at 30 (noting that the average premiums paid by Idaho solo lawyers to
ALPS, a bar-affiliated insurer, was $2200).
260. Lieske, supra note 185, at 544; Mead, supra note 191, at 275.
261. Mead, supra note 191, at 275.
262. How Appellate Court and Supreme Court Justices are Selected, CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.
gov/7434.htm [https://perma.cc/WEJ7-ZPYT].
263. Id. Justices are typically elected to twelve-year terms. Id.
264. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1151 (Cal. 1994).
265. Id. (quoting Hustedt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Cal. 1981).
266. About Us, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/T2FXC9EA]. For discussions of how the California State Bar became unified through lawyers' efforts, see MCKEAN,
supra note 44, at 46-47; Gallagher, supra note 44, at 522-25.
267. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 9.
268. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
269. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6001.2(a), 6013.5(a) (West 2019).
270. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West 2019). In 2017, the legislature enacted legislation requiring the
formation of a separate voluntary lawyers association (now known as the California Lawyers Association) so
that the California State Bar could focus on admissions and discipline while the voluntary association could
focus on section activities and educational programs. See Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. LAWYERS ASS'N,
https://calawyers.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/EU3R-SDE3].
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California has a professional, full-time legislature. 271 One way the legislature
influences the State Bar is through the budget process, because the State Bar is
statutorily required to submit a proposed budget for legislative approval.2 72 For
example, in September 1985, due to the legislature's displeasure with the State
Bar over its political activities and its Bar-run lawyer discipline system, it declined
to approve the bill needed to enable the State Bar to collect fees before the end of
the legislative session. 273 This left the State Bar unable to raise money for its operations until the legislature reconvened in January 1986. When the State Bar asked
the California Supreme Court to bail it out of this crisis by allowing it to collect
dues pending the legislature's return, the Court declined to do so. 2 74 In January
1986, Senator Robert Presley introduced a bill to establish an agency separate
from the State Bar to regulate lawyers. 275 The State Bar and voluntary lawyer
organizations resisted the bill, which was initially rebuffed. 276 Ultimately, in 1988,
the legislature voted to create a new State Bar Court under the Supreme Court's
control to replace the State Bar in handling disciplinary matters. 277
Where was the California Supreme Court-which had a reputation for being
activist and liberal278-when the legislature was stepping in to regulate lawyers?
The Court was vulnerable to political attack during this period 2 79 and may have
been unwilling to speak out to protect a lawyer discipline system that the public
viewed unfavorably. 280 In 1985, when the legislature began to act, Chief Justice
Rose Bird was facing a contentious retention election. 281 She and two other

271. The California legislature meets throughout the year and pays its members more than $110,000
annually. States with a Full-Time Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Stateswith_a_fulltime_ legislature [https://perma.cc/WVX4-KMPW]; Comparison of State Legislative Salaries, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Comparisonof state legislative salaries [https://perma.cc/FDM8-6ZVQ].
272. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.1 (West 2019).
273. See Dan Morain, Justices Reject CaliforniaBar's FinancialPlea, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1985, at A20
(noting that Assembly Republicans were "angry at the Bar for failings in its lawyer discipline system and for
taking stands on legislation and blocking judicial races"); see also RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL:
UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL MISCONDUCT 19-20, 22-23 (2011); Gallagher, supra note 44, at 490, 546-49. The
problems with lawyer discipline were highlighted by the San FranciscoExaminer in a six-part series that
appeared in March 1985. The news stories revealed that the discipline system was slow, unresponsive, and
overprotective of lawyers. Gallagher, supranote 44, at 490, 538.
274. Morain, supra note 273, at A20.
275. Gallagher, supra note 44, at 554.
276. Instead, the legislature required an outside Discipline Monitor to oversee the State Bar's lawyer discipline system. Id. at 555-57.
277. See S.B. 1498, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1987); Meighan A. Rowe, Note, ProtectingThose Who
Protect Others: The Implications of the State Bar Act on Attorneys' Rights in Disciplinary Proceedings,4 J.
LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 137, 140 (2002).
278. John H. Culver, The Transformationof the CaliforniaSupreme Court: 1977-1997, 61 ALB. L. REv.
1461, 1465-66 (1998); Kevin M. Mulcahy, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most Progressive
State Supreme Courtand What CaliforniaCan Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 863, 879-83 (2000).
279. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 18, at 271; Culver, supra note 278, at 1466-67.
280. See Gallagher, supra note 44, at 551-53.
281. See John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in
California,70 JUDICATURE 81, 87 (1986).
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Supreme Court justices lost their seats in the November 1986 election, in part
because of their judicial activism.2 82 The new Supreme Court, headed by Chief
Justice Malcolm Lucas, became more moderate and cautious. 283 The California
Supreme Court has since been described as "deferential to legislative authority,
non-interventionist, non-supervisory and conflict avoiding. "284
California's initial consideration of how to regulate uninsured lawyers predated these political changes, but was later informed by these dynamics. In the
1970s, many LPL insurers left the California market and the cost of insurance
increased exponentially. 28 5 In 1976, the State Bar president suggested the creation
of a fund that would finance the actual cost of insurance, with all bar members
participating in it. 286 The public protection aspects of the proposal were reportedly "obscured by contests over whether it would serve all lawyers well and
whether the compulsory aspects of the plan [were] legal.'' 28 7 In 1985, Assembly
Speaker Willie Brown introduced a bill that would require all doctors and lawyers
to maintain malpractice insurance. 2 8 That bill did not pass, but in 1986, the legislature passed a bill requiring the State Bar to "develop rules and regulations providing that all active members of the State Bar shall possess professional liability
insurance.'' 28 9 The governor vetoed it because it did not expressly exclude public
agency attorneys and lawyers not engaged in law practice. 290 In May 1987, the
State Bar Board of Governors (the predecessor to the Board of Trustees) voted
16-4 to tentatively support a measure to require attorneys to obtain LPL insurance
provided through an insurance liability fund.291 The Board provided for a sixtyday comment period and planned a final vote thereafter.292 Not coincidentally,
Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly was sponsoring a bill in the legislature requiring
lawyers to maintain LPL insurance, which he threatened to pursue even if the

282. Mulcahy, supra note 278, at 890-92.
283. Id. at 892-93; see also Culver, supra note 278, at 1488.
284. Mulcahy, supra note 278, at 893. Not surprisingly, a survey of judges who faced retention elections
found that "even though judges rarely lose retention elections . . . three-fifths believed judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judicial behavior." Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections
and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306,312 (1994).
285. ABEL, supra note 273, at 14; see also Galante, supra note 139, at 19.
286. Ralph J. Gampell, President's Message: Malpractice Insurance: Equal Burden for All?, 51 CAL. ST.
B.J. 575, 577 (1976). The proposal emanated from concerns about obtaining coverage for members, but the
president also noted that the profession has "duties to society at large, including the ability to compensate a consumer who has suffered a negligent loss at our hands." Id.
287. Benjamin Franklin Boyer & Gary Conner, Legal Malpractice and Compulsory Client Protection, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 835, 836 (1978).
288. Jerry Gillam & Ann Blackman, Sacramento File, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1985, at 20.
289. State Assemb. B. 4255, 1985-86 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1986); see also Jerry Gillam, Sacramento File:
Assembly Floor Action, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1986, at 32.
290. GOvERNOR'S OFFICE, VETO MESSAGE-ASSEMBLY BILL No. 4225 (Sept. 30, 1986).

291. Ed Jahn, Lawyers' Insurance Measure Supported, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 10, 1987, at A-3.
292. Id.
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State Bar did not endorse it. 293 Local bar associations were split on the issue, with
most strongly opposing. 294 Insurance carriers also opposed it because they feared
a mandatory insurance liability fund would end their voluntary insurance programs with the bar. 295 Ultimately the State Bar did not proceed with the vote
because key legislators advised that the proposal would not pass due to opposition
from local bar associations and other constituencies. 296 As Terry Anderlini, former California State Bar president explained, "There were so many special interest groups lining up to say 'no' and no special interest group to push it." 297
Due to the legislature's concern about uninsured lawyers, in 1992, California
became the first state to require lawyers in private practice to disclose to clients in
their written fee contracts whether they carried at least $100,000 of LPL insurance.298 A year later, the California Trial Lawyers Association tried to eliminate
the provision, which it viewed as onerous, and obtained a sunset provision. 299
The disclosure requirement lapsed in 2000 and was not immediately reenacted.300
After the ABA adopted its Model Rule on Insurance Disclosure in 2004, the State
Bar, in consultation with the California Supreme Court, appointed a State Bar
Insurance Disclosure Task Force to study the issue. 301 In September 2007, after
two public comment periods on proposed rules, 30 2 the Task Force recommended
to the Board of Governors that a lawyer's lack of insurance should be disclosed
directly to clients and should be posted on the California State Bar website. 30 3 At

293. Id.; see also Anne Krueger, As More Lawyers Become Defendants, Malpractice Insurance is in
Spotlight, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 27, 1987, at A-1. As one county bar association president noted about
an insurance requirement, "[w]e're going to have it one way or another." Lorie Hearn, Attorneys May Face
MandatoryMalpracticeInsurance, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 25, 1987, at B-3.
294. See Hearn, supra note 293; see also Krueger, supranote 293.
295. See Telephone Interview with Terry Anderlini, former president, Cal. State Bar (June 25, 2019).
296. Id. The opponents included the Los Angeles County Bar Association, which would lose its voluntary
insurance program and associated commission payments, if all lawyers were required to belong to a single
fund. Id. Other opponents included insurers, some solo lawyers, and criminal defense lawyers who did not think
that they needed LPL insurance. Id.
297. Id.
298. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6147(a)(6) (West 1992); CAL. Bus. & PROF § 6148(a)(4) (West 1992);
Telephone Interview with Terry Anderlini, supranote 295. In 1986, the state legislature had previously considered adopting an insurance disclosure rule, but it failed to do so. See S.B. 1569, 1985-86 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1986).
299. Mike McKee, Bar Mulls RequisiteInsuranceDisclosure, THE RECORDER, June 21, 2006, at 1. The law
was also amended so that lawyers were only required to disclose if they did not carry the minimum level of insurance. Act of Oct. 11, 1993, ch. 295, § 2, 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4177, 5614.
300. James E. Towery, Should Disclosure of MalpracticeInsurance Be Mandatory?: Pro, GPSOLO MAG.,
Apr.-May 2003, at 36, 38. For an explanation of the political reasons why this occurred, see Mignone, supra
note 169, at 1079 n.50.
301. Towery Memorandum, supra note 171, at 2. The Task Force included an adviser to the California
Supreme Court and one member of the public. Id.
302. Id. at 12-14. Most of the 112 comments received in 2006 came from attorneys and 78.5% opposed the
proposal in whole or in part. Id. Likewise, during a second comment period after revisions, 78% of the comments opposed the proposal. Id.
303. Id. at 3.
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that time, five other states had direct disclosure requirements. 30 4 By a 9-8 vote,
the Board of Governors voted against the recommendations.305 There had been a
tie, which was broken by State Bar president Sheldon Sloan, who opposed posting the insurance information online.306
The Task Force subsequently revised the proposal to drop the controversial
provision about posting the insurance information on the State Bar website. 30 ' In
May 2008, the Board of Governors voted 16-4 to adopt a requirement that uninsured lawyers disclose directly to their clients in writing that they do not carry
LPL insurance. 30 8 At that time, State Bar president Jeff Bleich predicted that
regardless of what the State Bar did, the Supreme Court was likely to adopt some
kind of disclosure rule. 309 He also noted that the compromise essentially reflected
the old statutory system that lapsed in 2000.310 The California Supreme Court
adopted the rule without change in 2009.311
In September 2017, the state legislature enacted as part of the 2018 State Bar
Fee Bill a requirement that the State Bar study LPL insurance for California lawyers, including the advisability of mandating insurance, and to report its findings
by March 2019.312 Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, a lawyer, introduced it as part
of the bill that separated the State Bar's regulatory functions from its other activities.31 The Board of Trustees appointed a seventeen-member Malpractice
Insurance Working Group composed almost entirely of lawyers. 314 After studying
the issue, the Working Group found that "legal malpractice insurance is readily
available in California, and attorneys are able to obtain coverage at levels and
with terms commensurate with their needs." 315 Nevertheless, it concluded that
further study was required before a recommendation could be made about
304. Id. at 7.
305. Memorandum from Saul Bercovich, Staff Attorney, to Members of the Board of Governors 1 (Oct. 24,
2007).
306. Legal Services RegulatoryRoundup, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 30, 30.
307. Carole J. Buckner, Malpractice Insurance Disclosure Lurches Toward Approval, ORANGE COUNTY
LAw., Apr. 2008, at 50-51.
308. Dan Levine, Bar: UninsuredLawyers Must Inform Clients, THE RECORDER, May 20, 2008.
309. McCarthy, supra note 179.
310. See Levine, supra note 308.
311. Steven M. Ellis, Supreme Court Adopts Malpractice Disclosure Rule, METROPOLITAN NEWSENTERPRISE (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.metnews.com/articles/2009/malp082809.htm
[https://perma.cc/
SE6Z-8BH9].
312. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6069.5(a)-(b) (West 2019).
313. S.B. 36, 2017-18 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), ch. 422 § 40; see Dan Walters, Legislature Tries State
Bar Fix, but Remedy Falls Short, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 14, 2017), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/politics-columns-blogs/dan-walters/article150328762.html [https://perma.cc/2HJN-364P].
314. STATE BAR OF CAL., MALPRACTICE INS. WORKING GROUP, CHARTER, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/
Portals/0/documents/cc/Malpractice-Insurance-Working-Group-Charter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6V9V-7YDD].
Four members of the Board of Trustees served in the Working Group. Id. There was one consumer advocate.
Id.
315. See STATE BAR OF CAL., MALPRACTICE INSURANCE WORKING GROUP REPORT TO THE BOARD OF

TRUSTEES 3-4, 7, 10 (Mar. 15, 2019), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/MalpracticeInsurance-ReportSummary-andSupreme-Court-Cover-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM3V-9D45].
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mandatory LPL insurance and suggested topics for study. 316 It further recommended to the Board of Trustees that information about an attorney's lack of insurance should be included on the State Bar's website.3 7 The Board of Trustees
forwarded these recommendations to the Supreme Court and the legislature. 318
Whether further action will be taken remains to be seen.
D. WASHINGTON

The Washington Supreme Court is known as an activist court 319 that has broken new ground in the area of lawyer regulation. In 2012, it approved the
licensing of non-lawyer legal services providers, known as Limited License
Legal Technicians ("LLLTs"), for the benefit of the public, notwithstanding
some strenuous lawyer opposition.3 2 Washington's nine Supreme Court justices are elected to six-year terms in non-partisan elections.321 The Court claims
the exclusive and inherent power to admit and discipline lawyers. 322 It rebuffed
the legislature's efforts to audit the Washington State Bar Association
("WSBA") under state agency auditing statutes, 323 but has held that the legislature may enact laws that govern the entrepreneurial aspects of law practice. 324
The part-time legislature 325 has generally deferred to the Supreme Court in the
area of lawyer regulation. 326

316. Id. at 12.
317. Id. at 12-13.
318. Letter from Leah T. Wilson, Exec. Dir. & Jason P. Lee, Chair, Cal. State Bar Bd. of Trustees, to Cal.
Supreme Court 1 (Mar. 27, 2019).
319. TARR & PORTER, supra note 18, at 368; see also Jim Brunner & Nina Shapiro, State Supreme Court:
Activist Justices, or Just Different?, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/politics/state-supreme-court-activist-justices-or-just-different/ [https://perma.cc/NS9W-QBAR] (describing
criticism that the Court has become more liberal and activist).
320. See Holland, supra note 17, at 77, 106-11. In doing so, the Court noted that "[p]rotecting the monopoly
status of attorneys in any practice area is not a legitimate objective." In the Matter of the Adoption of APR 28Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 257-A-1005, at 7 (2012).
321. Washington Supreme Court Justices, WASH. COURTS, https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellatetrial_
courts/SupremeCourt/?fa=supremecourt.justices [https://perma.cc/ZV67-UQNH] (last visited May 26, 2020);
Brief History of Washington State Supreme Court, WASH. COURTS, https://www.courts.wa.gov/education/?fa=
education.supreme [https://perma.cc/FC83-PUDK] (last visited May 26, 2020).
322. See In re Discipline of Blanchard, 144 P.3d 286, 292 (Wash. 2006); Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646,
652 (Wash. 1992); Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1984); State ex rel. Laughlin v. Wash. State
Bar Ass'n, 176 P.2d 301, 302-03 (Wash. 1947).
323. Graham v. State Bar Ass'n, 548 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Wash. 1976).
324. See Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1984) (finding that Washington's Consumer
Protection Act could be applied to lawyers).
325. The legislature meets for 105 days in odd-numbered years and 60 days in even-numbered years.
Welcome to the Washington State Legislature, WASH. STATE LEGIS., http://leg.wa.gov/legislature/Pages/
AboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/F5P5-W7L2] (last visited May 26, 2020). Legislators are paid about $49,000
annually. Comparison ofState Legislative Salaries, supra note 271.
326. For example, in 1997, the legislature passed a law that promoted the suspension of the occupational
licenses of individuals who failed to pay child support. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.20A.320 (1997). It added a note
stating that it was mindful of the separation of powers among the branches of government, and therefore
"strongly encourages the state supreme court to adopt rules providing for suspension and denial of licenses
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The Washington Bar Association was originally formed in 1888 as a voluntary
association. 32" By 1930, some lawyers wanted a more formal structure, and in
1933, the legislature established the WSBA as a mandatory bar and a state
agency. 328 Today it is part of the judicial branch and administers the bar admissions process and the lawyer discipline system. 32 9 The Board of Governors, which
is the governing body of the WSBA, is elected by WSBA members, and the
Board elects the president. 330
Like lawyers in other states, Washington lawyers experienced high premiums
and difficulty obtaining insurance coverage in the mid-1970s. 331 The WSBA peti-

tioned the Washington Supreme Court for a rule requiring all lawyers to carry
LPL insurance, but then the only insurer writing such insurance in the state withdrew. 33 2 Premiums again rose sharply in the mid-1980s, and in 1986, the WSBA
began to consider establishing a professional liability fund and a bar-related insurance company. 333 A WSBA task force designed a proposed professional liability fund, and the Board of Governors then held hearings to discuss the plan with
bar members. 334 In December 1986, the Board of Governors considered a motion
to recommend to the Washington Supreme Court that it adopt the proposed program and professional liability fund, which would require Washington lawyers in
private practice to participate in the fund, and would provide coverage of
$250,000/$250,000.33'After extended debate, it decided to submit the question of
whether to adopt the insurance program and fund to the membership in a referendum before making any recommendation to the Washington Supreme Court. 336
The membership defeated the referendum by a 6971 to 1693 vote.337

related to the practice of law to those individuals who are in noncompliance" with a support or visitation order.
1997 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 58, § 809.
327. History of the Bar, WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.wsba.org/about-wsba/whowe-are/history-of-the-wsba [https://perma.cc/28JW-D8LH].
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Wash. State Bar Ass'n Bylaws IV.A (adopted 2010), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/aboutwsba/governance/proposed-bylaw-amendments/bylaws-amended-may-17-2018-1 .pdf?sfvrsn=ba3c04fl_17
[https://perma.cc/ZVS9-FWYX]. The president is also a member of the Board. Id.
331. William H. Gates, Lawyers' MalpracticeInsurance: What Shall We Do?, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, May
1986, at 4.
332. Boyer & Conner, supranote 287, at 839.
333. Gates, supra note 331, at 4; Status Report on Malpractice Insurance Coverage and Professional
Liability Fund Proposal,WASH. ST. B. NEwS, Oct. 1986, at 27.
334. Gates, supra note 331, at 4.
335. Carole Grayson, The Board's Work, WASH. ST. B. NEWSLINE, Dec. 12-13, 1986; Professional
Liability Fund PlansFinalized;Issue Setfor Membership Vote, WASH. ST. B. NEwS, Jan. 1987, at 30, 30.
336. Grayson, supra note 335; Memorandum from Douglas J. Ende, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, to
Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Task Force, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1. A referendum was not required, but the
Board of Governors did so "[i]n view of the importance of the issue." Professional Liability Fund Plans
Finalized,supra note 335, at 30.
337. Memorandum from Douglas J. Ende, supranote 336, at 1.
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In 2004, Robert Welden, who was both chair of the ABA Standing Committee
on Client Protection and the WSBA's General Counsel, wrote to the Washington
Supreme Court about the ABA's Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure. Chief
Justice Gerry Alexander responded that the Court would not consider adopting
such a rule without first hearing from the WSBA.338 The WSBA began considering
the issue and in July 2005, invited public comment on a proposed insurance disclosure rule. 339 The Board of Governors subsequently voted 10-2, with one abstention,
to recommend a disclosure rule that would require lawyers to annually certify insurance information to the WSBA and would make the information available on its
website. 340 The Washington Supreme Court adopted the rule effective July 2007.341
In 2016, after a Washington lawyer raised the issue of mandatory insurance
with the WSBA's president, the WSBA's Board of Governors formed a working
group to gather information about mandatory malpractice insurance. 342 The
Board was mindful of the disparity between the treatment of Washington lawyers
and two other legal services providers-limited practice officers and LLLTswho were required to carry liability insurance or to demonstrate financial responsibility in order to maintain their licenses. 343 In September 2017, the Board of
Governors formed a task force to review the available data, obtain member input,
and recommend whether to proceed with a mandatory malpractice insurance proposal. 344 The seventeen-member task force was composed predominantly of
WSBA members, but also included a federal judge, an insurance broker, two academics, an LLLT, and two non-lawyer representatives. 34 In its March 2019
Report, it recommended that the WSBA Board of Governors propose a mandatory malpractice insurance rule for consideration by the Washington Supreme
Court that would require all Washington lawyers in private practice to maintain
minimum insurance of $250,000/$500,000.346 In preparing its report, it had
obtained assistance from ALPS, the WSBA's endorsed professional liability provider, including estimates of the likely cost of the insurance. 347 In May 2019, after

338. See Letter from Robert D. Welden, General Counsel, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, to Chief Justice Gerry L.
Alexander, Wash. Supreme Court (Aug. 24, 2005) (on file with author).
339. Bob Welden, Insurance-DisclosureRule Information and Requestfor Comments, WASH. ST. B. NEWS,
July 2005, at 38.
340. Letter from Robert D. Welden, supra note 338.
341. See Robert Welden, New Rule on MalpracticeInsuranceDisclosure, WASH. ST. B. NEwS, June 2007,
at 36.
342. Memorandum from Douglas J. Ende, supranote 336, at 1.
343. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, MANDATORY MALPRACTICE

INS.

TASK FORCE, CHARTER (Sept. 28,

2017), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legal-community/committees/mandatory-malpractice-insurancetask-force/task-force-charter.pdf?sfvrsn=381a3bf1_6 [https://perma.cc/F2TX-GLFKI.
344. Memorandum from Douglas J. Ende, supranote 336, at 2.
345. WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, MANDATORY MALPRACTICE

INS.

TASK FORCE, REPORT TO WSBA BOARD

OF GOVERNORS, supra note 160, at 1, app. B.
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id. at 7, 33-34. ALPS estimated that the annual cost of $250,000/$500,000 coverage for a solo corporate lawyer in Seattle would be about $2400. Id. at 33-34.
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the Board of Governors held a lengthy public hearing and received written comments, it rejected this recommendation by a 9-5 vote. 348 The majority of the
Board indicated they were reflecting the will of the State Bar members, who were
"overwhelmingly opposed" to mandatory insurance. 34 9
Kevin Whatley, a non-lawyer who had been the victim of legal malpractice by
an uninsured lawyer, was outraged by the decision and decided to pursue the matter further. 350 Whatley formed Equal Justice Washington for the purpose of lobbying the legislature for an LPL insurance requirement.35 1 He also spoke at
public comment sessions before the Supreme Court Work Group on Bar
Structure, where he met Chief Justice Mary Fairhurst, and told her about his disappointment with the WSBA's decision to reject an LPL insurance requirement.352 Chief Justice Fairhurst told Whatley that anyone could propose a rules
amendment to the Court. 353 In October 2019, Equal Justice Washington submitted a proposed amendment to Admission and Practice Rule 26 to the Supreme
Court, using the same language contained in the WSBA Task Force's
Proposal.354 In December 2019, the Court approved the suggested amendment for
publication and invited public comment." 5 It has received several comments,
including a letter opposing the proposed amendment from the WSBA's president.356 The deadline for comments is September 2020.3x'
E. NEVADA

Nevada came closer to adopting an insurance requirement, but it, too, ultimately failed. In recent years, Nevada has become one of the fastest-growing and
358
Its political culture is "individualistic.'3x9
most diverse states in the country.
348. Timothy Darraugh, Washington State Bar Nixes Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, BEST'S INS.
NEWS, May 31, 2019.
349. See id.
350. Telephone Interview with Kevin Whatley, Exec. Dir., Equal Justice Wash. (June 12, 2020). Whatley's
uninsured lawyer had neglected his personal injury case against an airline, which resulted in it being dismissed
with prejudice. As a result of his experience, Whatley had spoken in favor of mandatory LPL insurance both
before the WSBA's Task Force and at the Board of Governors' hearing. Telephone Interview with Kevin
Whatley, Exec. Dir., Equal Justice Wash. (Apr. 15, 2020).
351. Telephone Interview with Kevin Whatley, Exec. Dir., Equal Justice Wash. (June 12, 2020).

352. Id.
353. Telephone Interview with Kevin Whatley, supra note 350.
354. See Suggested Amendment, Admission and Practice Rule 26 Submitted by Equal Justice Washington (comment period active through Sept. 30, 2020), http://www.courts.wa.gov/court rules/?fa=courtrules.proposedRule
Display&ruleId=4751 [https://perma.cc/WE5L-K8PK] [hereinafter Suggested Amendment to APR 26].
355. Order in re Proposed Amendment to APR 26-Insurance, Publication Order 25700-A-1281 (Dec. 4,
2019).
356. See Letter from Rajeev D. Majumdar, WSBA President, to Susan L. Carlson, Clerk of the Wash.
Supreme Court (Jan. 26, 2020), http://www.courts.wa.gov/courtRules/proposed/2019Dec/APR26/Rajeev%
20Majumdar%20-%20APR%2026.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWA5-L2JR]. In the interest of full disclosure, the
author notes she submitted a letter in support of the proposal.
357. See Suggested Amendment to APR 26, supra note 354.
358. Nevada and Idaho Are the Nation's Fastest-Growing States, U.S. CENSUS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://
www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/estimates-national-state.html
[https://perma.cc/4CAR-QVGL];
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Nevada's seven Supreme Court justices are elected to six-year terms in non-partisan elections. 360 The Court claims that "[a]uthority to admit to practice and discipline is inherent and exclusive in the courts." 361 The legislature has not
challenged this assertion. Nevada's part-time legislature, which meets every other
year, is the fourth-smallest in the country. 362 There is currently a "mismatch
between institutional capacity and the policy demands of a fast-growing, urban
and diverse state,"'363 which may help account for why the legislature has been
relatively uninvolved in lawyer regulation.
In 1928, the legislature formed the mandatory State Bar of Nevada. 364 After
the legislature repealed the State Bar Act in 1963, the Nevada Supreme Court
reconstituted the mandatory bar in 1965 as a public corporation under the supervision of the Court. 365 The State Bar currently has more than 9000 active attorneys,
with more than 70% of Nevada lawyers living in Clark County (which includes
Las Vegas). 366 The State Bar is responsible for administering admissions and lawyer discipline.36 7 Its fifteen-member Board of Governors is composed entirely of
lawyers. 368 The State Bar's Board of Governors has the power to formulate rules
of professional conduct, subject to approval by the Supreme Court. 369 Most of the
proposals for changes in lawyer regulation come from the State Bar.3 71
Nevada reportedly considered mandatory insurance in the 1980s, 371 but no
records could be located. The State Bar of Nevada considered mandatory insurance in 2000, when a committee proposed to the Board of Governors that Nevada
lawyers be required to maintain LPL insurance in the amount of $500,000.372 The
Board sought input from the members and ultimately rejected the proposal in
June 2000, concluding there was insufficient support among the membership for

David F. Damore, Limits on Nevada's LegislatureKeep it From Serving the State, BROOKINGS (June 14, 2019),
https://www. brookings. edu/blog/fixgov/2019/06/ 14/limits-on-nevadas-legislature-keep-it-from-serving-thestate/ [https://perma.cc/8HJM-G6PG].
359. See Mead, supra note 191, at 275.
360. Nevada Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/NevadaSupremeCourt [https://perma.
cc/J468-EGW4] (last visited May 26, 2020).
361. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 39 (2018).
362. NEv. CONST. art. 4, § 2; Damore, supra note 358. The legislature meets for about four months and
legislators and are only paid for the first sixty days of the session, plus a per diem thereafter. NEv. CONST. art.
4, §§ 2,3,4; Damore, supranote 358.
363. Damore, supranote 358.
364. Our History, STATE BAR OF NEV., https://www.nvbar.org/about-us/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/
K8EU-V559] (last visited May 26, 2020).
365. See NEv. SUP. CT. R. 78 (2018).
366. See Lieske, supra note 185 and accompanying text.
367. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 49, 103 (2018).
368. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 81 (2018).
369. Nev. SUP. CT. R. 86(6) (2018).
370. Telephone Interview with Richard Pocker, former president, State Bar of Nev. (May 15, 2019).
371. See Goldfein, supra note 139, at 1296.
372. Schlegelmilch, supranote 147, at 9.
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mandatory insurance. 373 The Board of Governors instead appointed a new committee to explore alternatives to mandatory insurance, 374 but it does not appear
that the State Bar took any further action in the next few years.
After the ABA adopted its 2004 Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure,
the Nevada State Bar Board of Governors debated the issue and concluded that
they favored adoption of insurance disclosure. 375 There is no indication that the
Board sought the membership's views. 376 During an annual Nevada Supreme
Court/Board of Governors meeting, Justice James Hardesty indicated it would
be helpful if any such proposal included an analysis of the availability of malpractice insurance in Nevada.377 In its petition in support of the rule change, the State
Bar reported that there were approximately thirty-five malpractice carriers on file
with the Division of Insurance and reported anecdotal information about the cost
of insurance. 378 The State Bar petition to the Supreme Court asserted that disclosure "will reduce potential public harm and increase the public trust by allowing
the public to make an informed decision when hiring a lawyer." 379 It further
stated that the information should be available to the public, but did not specify
the manner in which that should occur. 380 In September 2005, the Supreme Court
adopted an insurance disclosure rule that required lawyers in private practice to
certify annually on their registration forms whether they maintain LPL insurance
and the name and address of the carrier. 381 The order further stated that the "information shall be public." 38 2 The insurance information was subsequently only
made available by phone or email inquiry to the State Bar. 3 83
Nevada again considered mandatory LPL insurance starting in 2017, after a
prominent Las Vegas plaintiffs' lawyer wrote an "open letter" to the Nevada
Supreme Court and the Nevada State Bar Board of Governors that appeared in

373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79 Regarding Member Reporting Requirement, ADKT
384, at 2-3 (Nev. Sup. Ct. May 27, 2005).
376. The only mention of the subject in the Nevada Lawyer refers to the Board's approval of the petition to
be filed in the Supreme Court "seeking the imposition of mandatory disclosure of professional liability insurance by all Nevada attorneys." See Allen Kimbrough, Board of Governors Meets in Reno, NEv. LAW, July
2005, at 42.
377. Amendments to Sup. Ct. R. 79, supranote 375, at 3.
378. Id. at 4.
379. Id. at 2. The petition included draft rule language; Welden's 2004 letter to the Nevada Chief Justice,
accompanied by the attachments previously sent to the Court; and a summary of the Bar's findings about the
availability of insurance in Nevada.
380. This approach was consistent with the ABA Model Court Rule, which states that insurance information
"will be made available by such means as designated by the highest court in the jurisdiction." See ABA MODEL
CT. RULE ON INS. DISCLOSURE (AM. BAR ASS'N 2004).

381. See Order Amending Rule 79 of the Supreme Court Rules, In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule
79, ADKT 384 (Nev. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2005).
382. Id.
383. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT
RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE, supranote 137, at 5.
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Vegas Legal Magazine.384 He decried the "hypocrisy" of not requiring lawyers to
maintain liability insurance, especially when many other Nevada professionals
were required to do so. 385 The State Bar formed a Professional Liability
Insurance Task Force composed entirely of lawyers 386 to study whether lawyers
"should be required to carry, or disclose whether they carry" LPL insurance. 3 87
The Task Force surveyed uninsured Nevada lawyers to learn more about them.388
It also conducted an "unofficial survey" of the public, and found that respondents
believed attorneys should maintain malpractice insurance. 389 In addition, it met
with LPL insurers who indicated they supported certain options being considered
by the Task Force. 390 The Task Force ultimately recommended that all attorneys
engaged in law practice-except government and corporate counsel-carry
a minimum of $250,000/$250,000 in liability insurance. 391 The Board of
Governors approved the proposal in November 2017, but voted to survey State
Bar members to learn their views before submitting a petition to the Court. 392 The
survey they conducted revealed that more than 56% of the approximately 1000
members who responded to the survey opposed direct disclosure, and many
voiced concerns about an insurance requirement. 393 Nevertheless, the Board of
Governors petitioned the Supreme Court in June 2018 for a rule change to require
lawyers in private practice to carry LPL insurance. 3 94 The petition included a

summary of the results of the lawyer survey, and the open-ended survey
responses from over 400 members. 395 It also included a discussion of the likely
cost of LPL insurance for uninsured Nevada practitioners, which it estimated
would start low but rise after six years to an average of about $3500 for Clark
County lawyers and $3100 for lawyers in the rest of Nevada. 396

384. See Robert T. Eglet, An Open Letter, VEGAs LEGAL MAG., Jan. 12, 2017.
385. Id.
386. Join the Discussion: Whether Malpractice Insurance Should be Mandatory for Nevada Attorneys,
NEv. LAw., Dec. 2017, at 28; Telephone Interview with Richard Pocker, supra note 370.
387. Bryan K. Scott, Messagefrom the President: Updatesfrom the Bar, NEv. LAw., Apr. 2017, at 4.
388. See Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, ADKT 534, supra note 27, at Ex. C.
389. See Vernon Leverty, Message from the President: Tipping the Scales in Honor of Our Profession,
NEv. LAw., Apr. 2018, at 4.
390. See Join the Discussion,supranote 386, at 29.
391. State Bar of Nevada, Minutes of Board of Governors Meeting, Nov. 8, 2017, at 2. It also recommended,
alternatively, that if lawyers did not maintain insurance, they must disclose this information in writing to clients. Id.
392. Id. at 2.
393. See Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, ADKT 534, supra note 27, at Ex. D.
394. Id. This is not the first occasion that the State Bar's leadership evidenced a greater commitment to the
public than some of its members. In the 1990s, the State Bar of Nevada's Board of Governors approved and
filed a petition with the Supreme Court to implement a mandatory pro bono plan. They subsequently withdrew
the petition because they had not consulted with members, who voiced strong opposition. See Kendra Emi
Nitta, An EthicalEvaluationof Mandatory ProBono, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 909, 913-17 (1996).
395. Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, ADKT 534, supra note 27, at Ex. D.
396. Id. at 11-12.
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The Nevada Supreme Court then invited written comments from the bench,
bar, and public, and held a public hearing. 397 Written support came from a few
individual lawyers and the Nevada Justice Association (the trial lawyers). 398 Far
more lawyers wrote in opposition to an insurance requirement, including a letter
signed by 127 members of the State Bar.399 At the public hearing in July 2018,
the Court also heard "great opposition" from bar members. 400 The Court subsequently rejected the proposed insurance requirement, stating that the Bar had not
provided sufficient data, but without explaining what type of data were missing.401 Lawyer opposition from well-respected bar members contributed to the
Court's decision to effectively kill the insurance initiative. 40

2

F. NEW JERSEY

The seven-member New Jersey Supreme Court has long been known for judicial activism, liberal reformist activities, and a commitment to individual and
consumer rights. 4 03 The governor nominates and appoints the Supreme Court jus-

tices, subject to confirmation by the state senate. 4 04 After the first seven-year
term, the justice can be reappointed by the governor with the consent of the
senate, but thereafter, the judge receives tenure until age seventy. 405 This

397. Order Scheduling Public Hearing and Requesting Public Comment, ADKT 534, In re Amendment to
Supreme Court Rule 79 (Nev. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2018).
398. See, e.g., Robert T. Eglet, Comment Filed In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79 Regarding
Professional Liability Insurance, ADKT 0534 (Jul. 10, 2018); Nancy Avanzino-Gilbert, Comment Filed In re
Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79 Regarding Professional Liability Insurance, ADKT 0534 (Jul. 16,
2018); Mark W. Knobel, Comment Filed In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79 Regarding Professional
Liability Insurance, ADKT 0534 (Jul. 16, 2018).
399. Mauricio Hernandez et al., Comment Filed In re Amendments to Supreme Court Rule 79 Regarding
Professional Liability Insurance, ADKT 0534 (Jul. 11, 2018).
400. David Eric Kassab, Avoiding Accountability: The Rise of MandatoryLegal Malpracticeand Insurance
Disclosure,ABA/BNA LAw. MANUAL OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Oct. 30, 2018.
401. Order Denying Petition for Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 79, ADKT 534, supra note 135.
402. See Telephone Interview with Richard Pocker, supra note 370.
403. TARR & PORTER, supra note 18, at 184, 237; John B. Wefing, The Performance of the New Jersey
Supreme Courtat the Opening of the Twenty-First Century: New Case, Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REv.
769, 771, 815-18 (2001); Virginia A. Long, The Purple Threat; Social Justice as a Recurring Theme in the
Decisions of the Poritz Court, N.J. L.J., Oct. 30, 2006; Charles Toutant, NJ Justices Call Provision of
Consumer Contract Unenforceable, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 15, 2019, at 3. The current Chief Justice,
Stuart Rabner, has also been characterized as an activist. See Supreme Court's Stuart Rabner, Saved from
Christie's Axe, NJ.COM (May 22, 2014), https://www.nj.com/opinion/2014/05/christie reappoint chief
justice-stuartrabner.html#incartriver [https://perma.cc/8QP9-K4DP].
404. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI (I). The New Jersey State Bar Association reviews the qualifications of a governor's intended nominees, but a compact with the governor's office requires the Bar to keep the vetting process
confidential and to report only to the governor on whether it deems a candidate qualified. Michael Booth,
Supreme Court Nominee Faces Resistance as Hearing Looms, N.J. L.J., May 28, 2012, at 1. The State Bar
reserves the right to testify at a confirmation hearing, however, if the Bar gives the candidate a "not qualified"
rating and the governor nominates the candidate anyway. Id.
405. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI (3).
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provides the justices with a large measure of autonomy.40'
The New Jersey Supreme Court claims the exclusive authority to regulate lawyers under the state Constitution, 407 which vests the Court with "jurisdiction over
the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted." 408
The Court has shared its jurisdiction with the legislature "in the spirit of comity,"
but it will not do so when the legislature enacts laws governing procedural matters or lawyer discipline. 409 The legislature meets annually 410 and occasionally
passes laws affecting legal practice but has generally steered clear of the areas of
admission and discipline. 411 In 1998, it passed legislation requiring physicians
and podiatrists to carry malpractice insurance 41 2 but did not impose such a
requirement on lawyers.
More than 98,000 lawyers are admitted to practice in New Jersey. 413 The state
has no mandatory bar association. The voluntary New Jersey State Bar
Association ("NJSBA"), which was formed in 1899, has more than 18,000 members, including paralegals and law students. 414 The Board of Trustees, which is
mostly elected by the members, manages the affairs of the NJSBA. 415 It has no
regulatory authority but often provides input during the rulemaking process. One
indication of the Supreme Court's view of the NJSBA's role can be seen in Chief
Justice Robert Wilentz's statement in 1982, "I will not take any action which
affects the Bar without giving you a meaningful opportunity to comment, discuss
and argue." He added, "I assure you that there are six justices determined to help
me keep that vow." 416

406. Nevertheless, in recent years, Governor Chris Christie declined to renominate two sitting justices for
reasons unrelated to the judges' qualifications. See NJSBA Resolution Urges Constitutional Amendment to
ProtectJudicialIndependence, N.J. L.J., Apr. 11, 2014.
407. In re Application of LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1271 (N.J. 1981); Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F.
McLaughlin, The Redefining of ProfessionalEthics in New Jersey Under Chief Justice Robert Wilentz: A
Legacy of Reform, 7 SETON HALL. CONST. L.J. 351, 353-54 (1997).
408. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § II.
409. See McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 626 A.2d 425, 429 (N.J. 1993) (limiting the
application of a New Jersey statute proscribing frivolous lawsuits so that it imposed attorneys' fees on a party
but not the party's lawyers).
410. N.J. CONST. art IV, § 1. The legislature is not, however, considered a professional legislature, in part
because legislators only receive salaries of $49,000 per year. See Comparisonof State Legislative Salaries,supra note 271.
411. For example, it has passed legislation governing lawyers' fees and retainer agreements in family law
cases. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:3-5 (West 2018).
412. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:5-5.3, 45:9-19.17 (West 2018).
413. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
414. About Us, N.J. STATE BAR AsS'N, https://tcms.njsba.com/PersonifyEbusiness/AboutUs.aspx [https://
perma.cc/P2EX-E32M]; Join the NJSBA, N.J. STATE BAR AsS'N, https://tcms.njsba.com/PersonifyEbusiness/

JointheNJSBA.aspx [https://perma.cc/9FYZ-TPXW].
415. N.J. State Bar Ass'n Bylaws art. VI, § 2.
416. Cheryl Baisden, The New Jersey State Bar Association: The First100 Years, N.J. LAW., Oct. 1999, at
19, 52.
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New Jersey was a national leader in the area of attorney regulation in the 1980s
and 1990s.4 7 It was on the forefront of efforts to protect clients with client protection funds, random audits, mandatory fee arbitration, and continuing legal education requirements. 418 The New Jersey Supreme Court has been willing to
disregard the NJSBA's preferences in order to protect the public. For example, in
1984, it adopted a controversial rule which stated that a lawyer may not "knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure." 4 19 The NJSBA asked the Supreme
Court to withhold implementation of the rule, 42 0 but the Court declined to do so.
In 1994, the Court sided with the New Jersey Ethics Commission's recommendations to make lawyer discipline complaints public when a discipline complaint
became formal and to eliminate private admonitions, notwithstanding "vehement
opposition" from the NJSBA. 421
New Jersey's experience with LPL insurance requirements began in 1970,
when the New Jersey Supreme Court first required lawyers practicing in professional corporations to carry LPL insurance. 422 In 1993, the Michels Commission,
which Chief Justice Wilentz appointed to recommend changes to New Jersey's
ethics system, recommended that uninsured attorneys should be required to disclose non-coverage, but that recommendation was rejected without comment by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.423 Starting in 1997, court rules required all limited liability companies ("LLCs") and limited liability partnerships ("LLPs") utilized by lawyers to maintain liability insurance. 4 24 In late 2003, as Assemblyman
Jon Bramnick was poised to introduce a bill requiring New Jersey lawyers to
carry LPL insurance, commentary appeared in the New Jersey Law Journal

417. See Mark E. Hopkins, Open Attorney Discipline: New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision to Make
Attorney DisciplinaryProceduresPublic-Whatit Means to Attorneys and the Public, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 757,
786 (1996).
418. Id. at 786.
419. See N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(5) (1984). This rule had no counterpart in the Model
Rules and is triggered even without an earlier affirmative misrepresentation by the attorney or the client.
420. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 81, 95 n.52 (1994).
421. Hopkins, supra note 417, at 764. Likewise, in 1995 it overturned an advisory rule issued by its
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law that would have prohibited brokers and title companies from
handling real estate closings without a lawyer. Joyce A Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Law
Conveyancers-EmpiricalEvidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 CONN. L. REv. 423, 436 (1999). The Supreme
Court concluded the public interest would be better served by permitting laypersons to perform those legal services, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary from the NJSBA. Id. at 445-46,464-65,475-76.
422. See Bennett J. Wasserman, All Clients Deserve Protectionfrom ProfessionalNegligence, N.J. L.J.,
Jan. 20, 2014.
423. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note
161, at 1-2.
424. See id. at 14. Lawyers working in those entities could limit their vicarious liability, but the LLPs and
LLCs were required to maintain at least $100,000 per occurrence for each attorney employed by the firm, up to
$5 million. See David S. Neufeld, Shelter from the Storm: A Review of Business Entities Available to New
Jersey Professionals,N.J. L.J., Mar. 2, 1998, at 3.
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questioning whether the Court would uphold such legislation.425 The legislature
never voted on the bill.42 6
The next year, when the ABA was considering adopting its Model Court Rule
for Insurance Disclosure, the NJSBA's Executive Director wrote a letter opposing such a rule. The main reasons were that it would "impose cumbersome and
unnecessary requirements on lawyers," and it might "open the door" to consideration of an LPL insurance requirement. 42 7 During the 2006-2008 rules cycle, the
New Jersey Supreme Court Professional Responsibility Rules Committee, which
was composed of judges and lawyers, considered whether disclosure should be
required, but concluded it was not in a position to make a recommendation and
sought more time. 428 In December 2009, it recommended the formation of an ad
hoc committee to gather data to consider the issues of mandatory disclosure and
mandatory insurance. 429
In January 2010, Bennett Wasserman and Krishna Shah, private practitioners
knowledgeable about legal malpractice issues, published an article in the New
Jersey Law Journal calling for mandatory LPL insurance. 430 Although the
Supreme Court reportedly formed a committee to study the issue in October
2010,431 it is unclear what happened to that effort. Wasserman again published an
article in the New Jersey Law Journalin January 2014 making the case for requiring lawyers to maintain LPL insurance. 432 The next month, the Supreme Court
formed an eighteen-member Ad Hoc Committee on Malpractice Insurance
chaired by a retired Appellate Division judge and mainly composed of lawyers. 433
It included Wasserman and Robert Hille, the NJSBA's designee who practices in
the area of professional liability defense. 434 The Committee also included one
public member and an insurance industry member. 435
In June 2017, the Ad Hoc Committee issued a 174-page report (plus appendices) recommending against mandatory insurance. It stated that the creation of a
425. See William H. Michelson, MandatoryMalpracticeInsurance:Laudable but Unenforceable,N.J. L.J.,
Nov. 3, 2003, at 7.
426. See Assemb. B. 617, 211th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004)
427. Letter from Harold L. Rubenstein, Exec. Dir., NJSBA, to John Holtaway, ABA Ctr. for Prof'1 Resp.
(Feb. 26, 2004) (on file with author).
428. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note
161, at 2-3.
429. Id. at 3, app. A.
430. Bennett J. Wasserman & Krishna J. Shah, Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance: The Time Has
Come, N.J. L.J., Jan.14, 2010.
431. See Charles Toutant, Panel to Study Mandatory MalpracticeInsurancefor Lawyers, N.J. L.J., Oct. 4,
2010.
432. Wasserman, supra note 422.
433. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note
161, at 3-4, 167-68.
434. Id. at 167-68; ROBERT B. HILLE, MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, http://www.mdmc-

law.com/tasks/sites/mdmc/assets/file/pdfs/bio/RobertB-Hille.pdf

[https://perma.cc/5U52-AR62].

435. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note

161, at 3-4, 167-68.
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fund modeled on Oregon's PLF would be "unworkable in the New Jersey marketplace." 436 It also concluded that a mandate "would be unfairly punitive" to solo
and small firm lawyers and attorneys engaged in part-time practice, presumably
due to the cost. 437 The Committee report further expressed concerns about insurers being able to decide who could practice law. 438 Some Committee members
were also concerned, based on communications with insurers, that insurers would
withdraw from the market if LPL insurance were required. 439 Instead of requiring
lawyers to maintain insurance, the Committee recommended insurance disclosure
to the Court and direct disclosure to clients. 440
In November 2017, the Supreme Court invited written comments from lawyersbut not the public-on the Committee's report. 4 4 1 The New Jersey Association

for Justice (the trial lawyers) wrote a letter supporting mandatory disclosure. 442
Two lawyers in private practice wrote letters opposing mandatory insurance and
direct disclosure. 4 4 3 Hille, then the NJSBA's president, also sent a letter stating
that the NJSBA opposed both mandatory insurance and any disclosure requirement. 444 He argued that NJSBA studies "show that malpractice insurance rates
in New Jersey start at 33% higher than in Pennsylvania and 49% higher than in
New York, due to New Jersey's longer statute of limitations for malpractice
claims and the potential of attorneys' fee awards [to plaintiffs] under Saffer v.
Willoughby." 4 4 5 At about that same time, state Senator Nicholas Scutari intro-

duced a bill to require attorneys to carry LPL insurance that was referred to the
Judiciary Committee, but no action was taken. 4 4 6
These events must be viewed in the context of other longstanding efforts by
some New Jersey lawyers and insurance companies to limit plaintiffs' recoveries
436. Id. at. 7, 132.
437. Id. at 8. It further claimed that mandatory insurance may economically preclude some lawyers from
practicing law. Id. at 136.
438. Id. at 132-34.
439. See Telephone Interview with Ad Hoc Comm. Member (June 20, 2019). Insurers may have been concerned that if there were an insurance requirement, they would be pressured to write coverage for all lawyers in
the state, regardless of claims experience.
440. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note
161, at 7-10, 144-45.
441. See Notice to the Bar, Report of the Supreme Court Ad Hoc Comm. on Attorney Malpractice
Insurance - Publication for Comment (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/2017/n171113a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E28Z-N56P].
442. Letter from Eric G. Kahn, President, N.J. Ass'n for Justice, to Glenn A. Grant, Acting Admin. Dir. of
the N.J. Courts (Jan. 2, 2018) (on file with author).
443. See Letter from Robert W. Ruggieri to Glenn A. Grant, Acting Admin. Dir. of the N.J. Courts (Dec. 20,
2017) (on file with author); Letter from Albert H. Sauer to Glenn A. Grant, Acting Admin. Dir. of the N.J.
Courts (Dec. 20, 2017) (on file with author).
444. Letter from Robert B. Hille, President, N.J. State Bar Ass'n, to Glenn A. Grant, Acting Admin. Dir. of
the N.J. Courts (Jan. 15, 2018) (on file with author).
445. Id. at 1.
446. See S.B. 821, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). In May 2015, Scutari had also introduced a bill
requiring all New Jersey lawyers in private practice to be covered by LPL insurance, which was carried over in
2016, but no action was taken. S.B. 2897, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2015).
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in legal malpractice cases. In its 1996 decision in Saffer, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a successful malpractice plaintiff could recover attorneys' fees as
compensatory damages in a legal malpractice case.447 Initially, insurers' lawyers
sought to repeal or limit the Saffer case through litigation because it increased the
cost of malpractice claims.44 8 The NJSBA subsequently joined with the insurance
industry in that fight. Since 2008, the NJSBA has lobbied in the New Jersey legislature to shorten the six-year statute of limitations for lawyer malpractice to two
years and for legislative abrogation of the Saffer case.t 9 These efforts were supported by some other county and affinity bar associations in the state, and the insurance industry.4 50 They were opposed by the New Jersey Association for
"

Justice.4

In February 2018, the New Jersey Law Journal published an editorial urging
the Supreme Court to adopt the direct disclosure requirement. 452 It was not until
March 2019 that the Supreme Court issued a Notice to the Bar of its decision and
planned next steps. The relatively brief notice stated that the Court agreed with
the Task Force not to require lawyers to maintain LPL insurance. 453 It then indicated that it would require insured lawyers to file with the Court certificates of insurance setting forth policy information, and would devise procedures to make
that information available to consumers online. 454 The Court stated that after considering the comments received on the direct disclosure proposal, it would withhold action on the recommendation until an unspecified later date. 455
It is conceivable that the Supreme Court was persuaded that mandatory insurance was inappropriate in the New Jersey market because of the cost of LPL

447. Saffer v. Willoughby, 670 A.2d 527, 535 (N.J. 1996). The court subsequently permitted non-clients to
recover attorneys' fees in some malpractice cases. See Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 136 A.3d 108, 116 (N.J.
2016).
448. See Henry Gottlieb, Carriers'Lawyers MarshalForcesfor Assault on Saffer Fee-Shifting Rule, N.J. L.
J., Nov. 12, 2001, at 45; Charles Toutant, A Broadside at Saffer Fee Shifting, N.J. L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at 28;
Henry Gottlieb, Testing the Reach of Saffer Fee-Shifting; Defense Lawyer Seeking Repeal, N.J. L.J., Oct. 18,
2004, at 22.
449. Valerie Brown, Pro-Attorney LegislationTops NJSBA Legislative Agenda, N.J. LAW., Aug. 11, 2008,
at 2. This lobbying continued into 2019. See New Jersey State Bar Association-CapitolReport, N.J. L.J., Apr.
1, 2019.
450. See Bar Report-CapitolReport, N.J. L.J., Mar. 25, 2019. USI Senior Vice President Mike Mooney,
who made a presentation and arguments in favor of the bill before the legislature, also acted as a "resource associate member" of the Ad Hoc Committee and provided information to that Committee about LPL insurance
costs in New Jersey.

REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD HOC COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE

INSURANCE, supra note 161, at app. FF.
451. BarReport, supra note 450.
452. MalpracticeInsurance Status Should be Disclosed to Clients, N.J. L.J. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.
law.com/njlawjournal/2018/02/19/malpractice-insurance-status-should-be-disclosed-t/
[https://perma.cc/2H6FBBAP].
453. Notice to the Bar - Ad Hoc Comm. on Attorney Malpractice Insurance; Supreme Court Action and
Next Steps (Mar. 11, 2019), https://njcourts.gov/notices/2019/n190313b.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2PK-639P].
454. Id.
455. Id.
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insurance there. 456 It is unclear, however, why this consumer-oriented court did
not follow the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation for direct disclosure. The
Court was in no hurry to form a committee to study these issues or to release its
conclusions, and may have been affected by events that were playing out in the
legislature. One New Jersey lawyer familiar with the matter suggested that the
Court may have wanted to assure the NJSBA that it was not relentlessly proconsumer, to the detriment of lawyers, especially when it knew that the NJSBA
was still "pissed off' with the Court due to the Saffer decision. 47 Or the Court
may have wished to send that message to the legislature, which was considering
shortening the statute of limitations for legal malpractice and statutorily abrogating Saffer. In any case, even in a state with a court that has previously adopted
public-regarding laws in the face of lawyer opposition, the New Jersey Supreme
Court declined to adopt strong public protection measures here.
G. TEXAS

Texas differs from the other states discussed, not only in its geographic location, but in its political culture, which is traditionalistic/individualistic. 458
Moreover, unlike the previously examined courts, the nine-member Texas
Supreme Court is elected through partisan elections. 459 Money is especially important in those elections. 46 0 Texas Supreme Court candidates raised more than
$4.2 million during the 2016 elections. 461 Lawyers are typically among the largest
donors. 462 The Court has often served as a stepping stone to other important
positions.463
456. See REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT AD Hoc COMM. ON ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra
note 161, at 153-55.
457. See Telephone Interview with Ad Hoc Comm. Member, supra note 432.
458. CAL JILLSON, TEXAS POLITICS: GOVERNING THE LONE STAR STATE 7 (3d ed. 2011).
459. Supreme Court of Tex., TEX. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/ [https://perma.cc/
KM8N-V84L] (last visited May 26, 2020). Justices are elected to six-year terms. Id. The Texas Supreme Court
is the court of last resort for civil cases. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort for
criminal cases. Court of Criminal Appeals, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/cca/ [https://perma.cc/
54JF-VUT9] (last visited May 26, 2020).
460. See Mark Pulliam, In Texas, a State Supreme Court Maintains Integrity, Despite Politics, NAT'L REV.
(June 13, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/06/texas-supreme-court-elected-justices-integritycalifornia-supreme-court-appointed-politicized/ [https://perma.cc/4SCK-96DZ].
461. Election Overview, FOLLOwTHEMONEY.ORG (2016), https://www.followthemoney.org/tools/electionoverview?s=TX&y=2016 [https://perma.cc/GWB8-3KV3] (last visited May 26, 2020).
462. See, e.g., Texans for Pub. Just., Courtroom Contributions Stain Supreme Court Campaigns 1 (2008),
http://info.tpj.org/reports/courtroomcontributions/courtroomcontributions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9BM-56T2];
Maurice Chammah, Judicial Donations Raise Questions of Partiality, TEX. TRIB. (March 26, 2013), https://
www.texastribune.org/2013/03/26/donations-judicial-campaigns-spur-ethics-worries/
[https://perma.cc/FF5XQZKZ]; Morgan Smith, Odor in the Court, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 2, 2010), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/02/02/
lawyers-biggest-donors-to-judicial-elections/ [https://perma.cc/2WN6-VJM2].
463. Pulliam, supra note 460 (noting that U.S. Senator John Cornyn previously served on the Texas
Supreme Court as did U.S. Representative Lloyd Doggett, Governor Greg Abbott, and several federal court
judges). Likewise, Alberto Gonzales served as a Texas Supreme Court justice for two years before becoming
White House Counsel to George W. Bush and then U.S. Attorney General. Attorney General: Alberto R.
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The Supreme Court has claimed implied inherent authority to regulate the legal
profession under the Texas Constitution 464 and administrative authority to regulate it under the State Bar Act. 465 It has also claimed that the authority to regulate
the practice of law belongs "exclusively" to the Court. 466 The part-time Texas
legislature, which meets in odd-numbered years, is seriously underpaid and
understaffed.4 67 Nevertheless, the legislature exercises some oversight of the
State Bar of Texas under the Texas Sunset Act, which provides for the legislature's review of state agencies every twelve years.4 68 Recent reviews have

focused on improving the lawyer discipline system and State Bar governance
issues.461

The Texas legislature formed the State Bar of Texas as a mandatory bar in
1939.470 The State Bar has over 103,000 active members. 471 It is a state agency
with some responsibility for the administration of lawyer discipline. 472 Its Board
of Directors is comprised of up to thirty lawyers who are elected for three-year
terms, six persons who are not licensed attorneys, and four at-large directors
appointed by the president. 473
In 1979, after LPL insurance premiums rose, the State Bar formed the Texas
Lawyers' Insurance Exchange as a bar-related mutual insurance company to

Gonzales (June 26, 2017), U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/gonzales-alberto-r

[https://

perma.cc/7VGZ-W6PZ].
464. State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994); Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.
W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. 1979).
465. See In re State Bar of Texas, 113 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the State Bar Act gives the
Court "administrative control" over the State Bar); Gomez, 891 S.W.2d at 245, 246 (noting that the Court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law is derived, in part, from the state constitution).
466. In re Dow, 481 S.W.3d 215, 224 (Tex. 2015).
467. The legislature meets for a maximum of 140 days that year, unless the governor calls a special session.
FrequentlyAsked Questions, TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://house.texas.gov/resources/frequentlyasked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/23H8-5423] (last visited May 26, 2020). Legislators earn $7200 annually,
plus a per diem. Comparison of State Legislative Salaries,supra note 271. Because it only meets biannually, it
is often "so hard pressed in the closing days and hours of the session that critical business is left undone."
JILLSON, supra note 458, at 93-94.
468. TEx. GOv'T CODE ANN. §§ 325.001-325.015 (West 2019).
469. See SUNSET ADVISORY COMM'N, STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, STATE BAR OF TEX. Al-A3
(June 2017), https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/State%20Bar%20of%2OTexas%20and
%20Board%20of%2OLaw%2OExaminers%2OStaff%2OReport%2Owith%2OFinal%2OResults_6-21-17_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CE27-CFGK]; John Sirman, Sunset Commission Takes a Close Look at the State Bar, 65
TEX. B.J. 500 (2002).
470. Our Mission, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutUs/
OurMission/default.htm [https://perma.cc/D5LV-6HL3] (last visited May 26, 2020).
471. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
472. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.011 (a) (West 2019); FrequentlyAsked Questions, STATE BAR OF TEX.,
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FrequentlyAskedQuestions&Template=/CM/HTML
Display.cfm&ContentID=42961 [https://perma.cc/KY4K-FY77] (last visited May. 26, 2020).
473. TEx. STATE BAR RULES art. IV, §§ 1, 3.
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provide lawyers with access to reasonably priced liability insurance. 474 Texas
lawyers, accountants, and other professionals later lobbied the state legislature in
1991 to pass the first LLP statute in the United States, which limited the vicarious
liability of lawyers for tort claims so long as the LLP maintained a total of
$100,000 of malpractice insurance. 475 In 1993, a Texas trial lawyer published an
article in the Texas Lawyer calling for a requirement that all lawyers maintain
professional liability insurance, 476 but it does not appear that it spurred any official action.
In 2007, Austin attorney Charles Herring, Jr. wrote to the Texas Supreme
Court asking it to consider forming a task force to study the 2004 ABA recommendation concerning insurance disclosure. 477 He noted that a 2005 State Bar
survey indicated that 63% of solo practitioners were uninsured. 478 The Supreme
Court then asked the State Bar president to consider whether Texas lawyers
should be required to disclose the existence or non-existence of LPL insurance. 4 79
In November 2007, the State Bar President appointed a Task Force on Insurance
Disclosure. 48 0 The Task Force conducted surveys of Bar members and found that
77% of lawyers responding to an email survey opposed an insurance disclosure
rule and that 65% of lawyers responding to a phone survey believed that lawyers
should not be required to disclose. 481 An April 2008 survey of the public revealed
that 70% of respondents believed that lawyers should be required to disclose to
clients whether they carry LPL insurance. 482 According to one observer, in the
midst of the process, the State Bar president added two anti-disclosure members
to the Task Force "to kill the deal. That's what the Bar leaders wanted.'' 48 3 In
June 2008, the Task Force recommended by a 6-5 vote that no insurance

474. About TLIE, TLIE, http://www.tlie.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/R67G-T5YX] (last visited May 26,
2020).
475. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection:Reflections on
the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 364, 392 n.112 (1998).
476. Bousquet, supra note 148, at 11.
477. Letter from Charles Herring Jr. to Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Tex. Supreme Court (July 30,
2007) (on file with author).
478. Id. The survey response rate is not known.
479. See Letter from Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Tex. Supreme Court, to Roland Johnson, President,
State Bar of Tex. (Apr. 14, 2010) (on file with author).
480. Memorandum from David J. Beck, Chair, Task Force on Insurance Disclosure, to State Bar of Tex. Bd.
of Dirs. 1 (June 11, 2008) (on file with author). The sole non-lawyer member was an Exxon employee and not a
consumer advocate.
481. Id. at 3; PLI Disclosure-Attorney Survey Findings-February 2008 (on file with author). The response
rate for the email survey was 6.6%. Memorandum from David J. Beck, supra note 480, at 3 n.2. One State Bar
section reportedly campaigned to get its members to oppose disclosure before the polling was complete. See
GRIEVANCE OVERSIGHT COMM., 2009 REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 3 (2009).

482. Mary Alice Robbins, Deja vu All Over Again: State to Reconsider InsuranceDisclosure, TEX. LAW.,
Oct. 5, 2009, at 16.
483. E-mail from Texas Task Force Member to Leslie C. Levin (Apr. 17, 2018: 21:41 EDT) (on file with
author).
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disclosure be required. 484 The State Bar Board of Directors forwarded the Task
Force's report to the Supreme Court without making its own recommendation.4 85
Thereafter, the Grievance Oversight Committee ("GOC"), a body appointed
by the Supreme Court and primarily tasked with reviewing the lawyer discipline
system, spent nine months reviewing the insurance disclosure issue.48' It conferred with the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, the Commission for Lawyer
Discipline, local bar leaders, bar leaders in the three states that had not adopted
the ABA disclosure rule, and members of the public. 487 It also looked at the cost
of LPL insurance and reviewed correspondence from lawyers opposed to disclosure. 488 The GOC recommended in its June 2009 report that the Supreme Court
adopt a disciplinary rule requiring disclosure if lawyers did not carry LPL insurance in the amount of $100,000/$300,000.489 This recommendation appeared two
months after Elliott Naishtat, a state representative from Austin, introduced a bill
providing for the promulgation of rules requiring uninsured lawyers to provide
notice to clients that they are uninsured. 490
The Supreme Court then asked the State Bar Board of Directors to take a position on the disclosure issue, which prompted further Bar study. 491 Bar leaders
held public hearings around the state, which were attended almost exclusively by
lawyers. 492 Once again, they found that lawyers overwhelmingly opposed the
proposal. 493 The Board commissioned a public opinion survey of 500 Texas residents which revealed that 88% of respondents reported they would be less likely

484. Memorandum from David J. Beck, supra note 480, at 7. Recognizing, however, that the Texas
Supreme Court might eventually decide to require some form of disclosure, the Task Force voted 6-4 to recommend that any required insurance disclosure be available only on the Texas State Bar's website and not through
direct disclosure to the client. Id.
485. Robbins, supra note 482.
486. Id. It is unclear whether it was asked by the Supreme Court to do so. Compare Mary Alice Robbins,
Report: Counsel Without Malpractice Insurance Should Tell Clients, TEX. LAW. (June 22, 2009), https://www.
law.com/texaslawyer/almID/120243 1632489/Report-Counsel-Without-Malpractice-Insurance-Should-TellClients/ [https://perma.cc/3X85-9FDV] with GRIEVANCE OVERSIGHT COMM., supra note 481, at 2.
487. GRIEVANCE OVERSIGHT COMM., supra note 481, at 2.

488. Id. at 2, 6-7.
489. Fortney, supra note 169, at 203-04; Mary Alice Robbins, State Bar Board Overwhelmingly Rejects
Insurance-Disclosure Rule, TEX. LAW., Feb. 8, 2010.
490. See H.B. 2825, 81st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009). The bill died in the House committee. See Campbell
& Chadwick, Talk, Talk, Talk: Background Discussions About the Proposed Requirement of Disclosure of
Lawyer E&O Insurance (Oct. 30, 2009), http://bruceacampbell.com/category/liability-insurance/ [https://
perma.cc/ZAP3-E6PV]. That bill apparently did not move forward because the Supreme Court was still
studying the issue, but it raised concerns among some lawyers that if a disclosure rule was not adopted, the
legislature might become more involved in lawyer regulation. See Chuck Herring, Pro: Disclosure Should be
Required, 72 TEx. B.J. 822, 822 (Nov. 2009); Robbins, State Bar Board Recommends Against Insurance
Disclosure, TEX. LAW., Feb. 1, 2010.
491. See Fortney, supra note 169, at 204; Robbins, supra note 476.
492. Bruce A. Campbell, A Viewpoint on Disclosure of Malpractice Insurance by Texas Lawyers (July
2010), https://www.cllegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/A-Viewpoint-on-Disclosure-of-MalpracticeInsurance-by-Texas-Lawyers1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX9U-D5D9].
493. See id.; Fortney, supra note 169, at 206.
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to hire a lawyer who did not carry LPL insurance and 64% believed that lawyers
should be required to reveal this information. 494 The Board also conducted focus
groups with thirty-seven members of the public, which revealed that 70% of participants initially believed that lawyers should be required to disclose, but after
hearing arguments for and against disclosure requirements and further discussion,
54% indicated there should be disclosure. 495 The focus groups were subsequently
criticized, however, for the way in which they were conducted. 496 Two citizens'
organizations wrote in support of a disclosure rule as did three former State Bar
presidents. 497 Nevertheless, in January 2010, the Texas State Bar Board of
Directors recommended by a vote of 39-1 against requiring disclosure. 498 They
further recommended that if the Supreme Court decided that disclosure should be
required, it should be in an administrative rule and that the information should
only be posted on the State Bar website, rather than through direct disclosure to
clients.499
In his letter to the Supreme Court explaining the Board's conclusion, State
Bar President Roland Johnson stressed that Texas lawyers "overwhelmingly
expressed their opposition to a requirement" and suggested that a disclosure
requirement would confuse the public because of the intricacies of insurance.5 00
Johnson also emphasized that when the public was asked for things they looked
for when hiring an attorney, "professional liability insurance is not even in the
top 10 answers received." 501 He did not mention that the survey asked for openended responses and that many members of the public assume that lawyers carry
insurance.

0

2

The Johnson letter and accompanying Executive Summary are strik-

ing in that-apart from referencing public support for the idea-they do not mention any of the arguments in favor of insurance disclosure.

494. PLI Disclosure Survey of the Public - November 2009, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.

com/pliflashdrive/material/PublicSurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PJB-BVZH].
495. Chris Fick & Greg Liddell, Personal Liability Insurance: Public Opinion Focus Group Study 9, 12
(Jan. 15, 2010), https://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/SBOT%20FG%20ReportFinalV3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UH6G-LNZQ].
496. See Mary Alice Robbins, The Report Card: Grading Roland Johnson's Term as State Bar President,

TEX. LAw., June 7, 2010.
497. See Letter from Juanita Valdez-Cox, Exec. Dir. of La Union del Pueblo Entero, to Bd. of the State Bar
of Tex. (Dec. 14, 2009); Letter from Tom Smith, Dir., Public Citizen, Tex. Office, to Roland K. Johnson,
President, State Bar of Tex. (Dec. 30, 2009); Fortney, supra note 169, at 208-09.
498. See Draft Official Minutes, State Bar of Tex. Bd. of Directors Meeting (Jan. 28-29, 2010), https://
www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=MeetingAgendasand_Minutes&Template=/CM/Content

Display.cfm&ContentFileID=319 [https://perma.cc/G8Q9-PUP7].
499. Id.
500. Letter from Roland K. Johnson, President, State Bar of Tex., to Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson,
Tex. Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 2010).
501. Id. at 2.
502. See id. The 2009 survey asked respondents to list the factors that influenced their decision to hire a lawyer but did not provide a menu of options from which to select. STATE BAR OF TEX., supra note 494.
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In April 2010, the Texas Supreme Court announced it would not adopt a disclosure rule.503 In a letter to the State Bar president, Chief Justice Wallace
Jefferson wrote, "Having considered the State Bar's recommendation and the
materials supporting the recommendation, the Court will retain the status quo. "504
The Supreme Court noted "good arguments" were presented on both sides." It
added:
Of course, we should be concerned if clients are unable to recoup sums occasioned by lawyer malpractice, or if the public would view the non-existence of
such insurance a critical factor in the decision to retain a lawyer. But, as your
process demonstrated, there is little evidence of either circumstance. 5 5

In fact, the State Bar did not investigate whether clients were unable to recoup
from uninsured lawyers. 506 Like the State Bar, the Supreme Court also did not
consider that when the public was asked to give open-ended answers about the
factors that were important when selecting a lawyer, they were probably unaware
that lawyers were not required to maintain LPL insurance. The Supreme Court
also seemingly credited the argument "that the public may assume erroneously
about mandatory disclosure that past insurance coverage is an assurance of future
coverage, "507 even though that problem can be readily addressed in insurance disclosure rules.508
Why did the Court defer to the Texas State Bar's position, notwithstanding the
Task Force's close vote and the recommendation by the GOC to adopt a disclosure rule? The Texas Supreme Court has not historically been active in the area
of lawyer regulation. 509 Indeed, it has a history of protecting lawyers, at least in
the area of lawyer malpractice. 510 This orientation may be due, in part, to Texas's

503. Tex. Sup. Ct. Advisory, Court Decides Against Mandatory Professional-Liability Insurance
Disclosure (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.txcourts.gov/AllArchivedDocuments/SupremeCourt/CourtNews
AndAdvisories/advisories/ProfessionalInsurance_Disclosure_041610.htm [https://perma.cc/J599-8QVJ].
504. Letter from Chief Justice Jefferson, supra note 479, at 1.
505. Id.
506. Indeed, Charles Herring offered such evidence when he first requested that the Supreme Court look at
the issue. See Herring, supra note 477 (noting that "when a lawyer shows that he has no malpractice insurance,
I almost never take a case, regardless of the wrongdoing"); see also Bousquet, supra note 148, at 11 (describing
instances of large default judgments against uninsured lawyers); Elder, supra note 26, at Al (describing client
who had an uncollectable $10 million judgment against an uninsured lawyer).
507. Letter from Chief Justice Jefferson, supra note 479.
508. Any disclosure requirement could impose on lawyers an obligation to notify clients if they become
uninsured during the representation and indeed, some states already impose this requirement. See, e.g., PA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (c) (2019); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (c) (2019).
509. For example, the Supreme Court declined the invitation to weigh in on the subject of mandatory pro
bono. One justice noted that the Court's primary role was adjudicating disputes, and that it preferred to leave
difficult issues, such as access to justice, to the legislature. State Bar v. Gomez, 891 S.W. 2d 243, 247-48 (Tex.
1994) (Gonzales, J., concurring).
510. See Rick Casey, The Coddled Lawyers of Our FairState, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 20, 2010 (describing
two Texas Supreme Court decisions making it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover in certain types of legal
malpractice cases).
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traditionalistic/individualistic political culture and the fact that Supreme Court
justices must raise more money for their re-election campaigns than justices in
any other state. 51 1 In addition, judges want to do well in the State Bar's judicial
polls, which signal the strength of lawyer support for Supreme Court candidates.512 Candidates also rely on well-respected lawyers, including past Bar presidents, for endorsements that they advertise during their campaigns.m513 Texas
Supreme Court justices have significant incentives to maintain good relations
with the bar if they wish to retain their positions or to advance from them.
V. WHEN WILL STATES REGULATE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC
FROM UNINSURED LAWYERS?

What lessons can be drawn from these case studies? Only seven states have
been examined. Each has its own institutional relationships and rulemaking process. The reasons for some key events-including the state supreme courts'
decisions-are not fully known. But there are some similarities that suggest some
tentative conclusions about when states will act to protect the public from uninsured lawyers. As discussed in the Conclusion, the factors identified here may
also help us understand more broadly when states will regulate lawyers in ways
that protect the public.
The state bar's willingness to endorse an insurance requirement seems to be crucial to the ultimate outcome. This can be seen in Oregon and Idaho-the only states
that require LPL insurance-where the State Bars proposed mandatory insurance
rules. In Oregon, many lawyers viewed the proposal as personally beneficial,
because the PLF was expected to provide insurance at a lower price than they were
paying on the open market. The legislature promptly enacted the OSB's proposal. In
Idaho, the ISB's resolution to require LPL insurance barely squeaked by the membership in at 51-49% vote. The Idaho Supreme Court, which traditionally adopts the
ISB's proposals, also did so in that instance. It is not always true, however, that
states will adopt such rules whenever they are officially proposed by the organized
bar. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the State Bar of Nevada's proposal to
adopt an insurance requirement after it heard objections from rank-and-file members. When the state bar does not endorse such initiatives, however, the case studies
(e.g., in New Jersey and Texas) revealed that they do not become law.5 1 4

511. Steve Miller, Texas Tops in State Supreme Court Election Fundraising,TEX. MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2018.
512. See STATE BAR OF TEx., 2018 Judicial Poll, Final Vote Summary (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.texasbar.
com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=39261&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
[https://perma.
cc/R9YK-J27P].
513. Endorsements for Justice Phil Johnson, CAMPAIGN FOR THE TEX. SUPREME COURT, [https://perma.cc/
4LYN-CMEE]; Endorsements for Justice Eva Guzman, CAMPAIGN FOR THE TEX. SUPREME COURT, https://
www.evaguzman.com/endorsements/ [https://perma.cc/2DE4-7BFU] (last visited May 26, 2020).
514. The outcome in Washington where the WSBA rejected mandatory insurance was unclear at the
time of publication.
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A second notable feature of most of the states' experiences is that the impetus
for examining the insurance issue came not from the courts, but from individual
lawyers. In Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington, the most recent calls to
address the issue of uninsured lawyers came from individuals who did not hold
leadership positions in the bar. 515 In Idaho, a new ISB Commissioner raised the
issue due to her personal experience with a victim of an uninsured lawyer. 516 In
California, a lawyer-legislator put the issue back on the agenda.5
It is worth pausing to ask: Where were the judges? Some courts may have
failed to initiate action because they were busy with their main work-deciding
cases-or because custom or law dictated such initiatives would come from the
bar. 518 Yet this is only a partial explanation. Public choice theory suggests that judicial inaction was predictable. Judges do sometimes initiate changes in lawyer
regulation when it is in their self-interest. For example, justices have initiated
efforts to address the problem of pro se litigants, who seriously burden the
courts. 519 But the issue of uninsured lawyers does not present a significant problem for the courts: these cases rarely make it to court at all, and they do not interfere with court administration. Nor is it a problem that has garnered much media
attention. Furthermore, judges may anticipate that lawyers are likely to be divided
on the issue of insurance requirements. Consequently, there is little reason for
judges, as self-interested actors, to initiate steps to address it.
It is also worth considering why the state legislatures have been mostly uninvolved in these issues. 520 Legislators may have had little interest in spending time
on legislation that would almost certainly be challenged in court (and possibly
invalidated) based on courts' assertion of their exclusive authority to regulate
lawyers or on separation of powers grounds. It is also likely that state legislatures
were not moved to take up this issue because constituents did not advocate for
change and legislators did not wish to antagonize the bar. The exception is
515. See supra notes 342, 384, 430, 432, and 477 and accompanying text. As noted, in Washington, once
the lawyer-initiated effort failed, it was taken up by a public interest group. The Nevada and Washington
Supreme Courts previously initiated efforts to look at insurance disclosure, but only after the ABA adopted and
recommended its Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure. See supra notes 338, 375 and accompanying text.
The Texas and New Jersey Supreme Courts seemingly ignored this development and did not act until lawyers
in those states raised the issue.
516. See Telephone Interview with Michelle Points, supra note 245 and accompanying text.
517. See supra text accompanying note 313. It is unclear who initiated the move to mandatory insurance in
the 1970s in Oregon, but it seems to have come from within the OSB.
518. In California, the Supreme Court may not have acted because the legislature was attempting to address
the issue.
519. See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, Lippman Announces Pro Bono Requirement for Bar Admission, LAW.COM
(May 2, 2012) (describing New York Chief Judge's initiative to require all bar applicants to provide fifty hours
of pro bono representation).
520. There were occasional attempts by individual lawyer-legislators to raise the need for insurance requirements in Texas and New Jersey, but they failed to garner support. See supra notes 425, 446, 490 and accompanying text. In fact, all of the legislators in California (Willie Brown, Lloyd Connelly, and Hannah-Beth
Jackson), New Jersey (Jon Bramnick and Nicholas Scutari), and Texas (Elliott Naishtat) who introduced legislation concerning mandatory LPL insurance were lawyers.

1028

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 33:969

California, where the legislature has looked periodically at the issue and in 2017,
ordered the State Bar to again study mandatory LPL insurance and other insurance issues. While the legislature's top-down directive and its relatively tight
time frame for the State Bar to issue a report may have contributed to the
Working Group's inability to make a recommendation on mandatory insurance,
it at least squarely put the issue on the agenda.
California's experience highlights the importance of a third factor-the process for studying and proposing lawyer regulation-to the ultimate outcome. In
Idaho, the Bar has the statutory authority to propose rules, and the Idaho Supreme
Court mostly waits for it to do so. Likewise, in Nevada the common practice
appears to be for proposals to emanate from the State Bar. In the latter, the regular
process enabled a small group of leaders to petition the Supreme Court for an insurance requirement, notwithstanding significant member opposition. Yet some
state bars are required to seek a membership vote on proposed rule changes; 2 1
even where such votes are not required, bar leaders may put a proposed rule
change to a membership vote for political cover. 2 2 Membership votes to approve
rule proposals can make the passage of public-regarding rules more difficult.
Lawyers opposed to the measures can organize against them and help bring out
the "no" votes, which happened in Texas. Exceptions may occur, however, in
states like Idaho, where the process occurred so quickly that it may have been difficult to organize against the mandatory insurance proposal. 23
Where the process permitted individual lawyers to directly advocate to the
state supreme court-via public hearings or written comments-this also directly
affected the outcome. Lawyers had no such opportunity in Oregon and Idaho,
where LPL insurance is now required. In New Jersey, where the Supreme Court
has thus far adopted an approach less protective of the public than its Ad Hoc
Committee recommended, the Court indicated this was due to the lawyer comments it received. In Nevada, after the State Bar petitioned the Supreme Court to
adopt an insurance requirement, the Court held a public hearing at which it heard
significant opposition from well-respected lawyers, and then rejected the Bar's
proposed requirement. Cultural capture may help explain the courts' decisions,
especially when lawyers' arguments were couched in terms of the impact of insurance requirements on their livelihoods. 2 4

521. See Idaho State Bar, 2016 Resolution Process, supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing the
Idaho resolution process); TEX. GOv'T CODE §§ 81.0877, 81.0878 (West 2018) (requiring a membership vote
for proposed disciplinary rule changes).
522. See, e.g., Welden, supra note 340 and accompanying text.
523. It also remains to be seen whether highly motivated actors can successfully circumvent the process.
See, e.g., supranotes 350-51, 354 and accompanying text (describing Equal Justice Washington's effort to circumvent the WSBA's decision to reject mandatory insurance).
524. Courts may be more willing to disregard lawyer opposition when regulatory proposals affect the
courts' work, as was the case with Washington's licensing of LLLTs and New Jersey's rules requiring greater
candor to the court. See supra notes 320,419-20 and accompanying text.
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The case studies further indicate that bar leadershipmatters. The Oregon State
Bar's leadership supported an insurance requirement, which they viewed as good
for lawyers. In Idaho, the ISB Commissioners assumed responsibility for studying mandatory insurance and then shepherded their insurance proposal to a successful conclusion. In Washington, bar leaders placed a strong proponent of
mandatory insurance, a federal judge, an LLLT, a member of the OSB, and two
public members on the Task Force that recommended the requirement. 25 In
Nevada, the Board of Governors petitioned the Supreme Court for an insurance
requirement, even though they were aware that many members opposed it. Yet
bar leaders in other states effectively undercut insurance initiatives. The president
of the State Bar of Texas added anti-disclosure members to the Task Force later
in the process, apparently to ensure defeat of a disclosure recommendation. The
NJSBA opposed insurance initiatives through its designee on the New Jersey
Supreme Court's Ad Hoc Committee, subsequently wrote the Court to oppose the
Committee's recommendation, and succeeded in persuading the Court to hold off
on a direct disclosure requirement.
The New Jersey experience suggests that the type of state bar associationmay
also have affected the outcome. In states with mandatory bars, the organizations
are usually public entities, their staff often performs some regulatory functions,
and their mission typically includes public protection. In some states, their boards
include non-lawyer members. Mandatory bars at least nominally have some obligations to the public. Voluntary state bar associations have no official regulatory
function and are freer to function in a manner more akin to guilds. Even when
they include public-spirited members, their boards may have more difficulty taking controversial positions because they want to maintain their voluntary members. In contrast to the mandatory bars in Oregon, Idaho, and Nevada, no
voluntary state bar has advocated for an LPL insurance requirement.
Another interest group-malpracticeinsurers-alsoinfluenced the outcome in
some states. The LPL insurance market is segmented geographically due to the
state-based nature of insurance regulation, and by size of firm.5 26 Both commercial insurers and bar-related mutual insurance companies provide LPL insurance
to solo and small firm lawyers.527 In California, insurer opposition to mandatory
insurance in the 1980s effectively helped to kill the legislature's mandatory insurance initiative. In that case, commercial insurers wanted to maintain their insurance programs with voluntary bar associations. In New Jersey, commercial
insurers assisted the NJSBA to help put the thumb on the scale against a malpractice insurance requirement. In contrast, in Idaho, Nevada, and Washington, a

525. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, MANDATORY MALPRACTICE INS. TASK FORCE, REPORT TO
BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

supranote 160, at 63-66.

526. Levin, supra note 142, at 565.

527. Id. at 565-66.
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historically bar-affiliated insurer (ALPS), assisted with information gathering and
supported some of the Bars' initiatives to mandate insurance. 528
In addition, political culture seemingly played a role in the states' handling of
the insurance issue. The mostly moralistic and moralistic/individualistic states
were willing to seriously consider mandatory insurance (California, Washington)
and in some states, implement the requirement (Oregon, Idaho). Nevada, which
has an individualistic political culture, does not neatly fit into this pattern,
because its State Bar not only considered mandatory insurance, but also recommended it to the Supreme Court. As noted, however, the Nevada Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the proposal, retaining a weak disclosure requirement. 529
Likewise, New Jersey, with its individualistic culture, only recently indicated it
would adopt a disclosure requirement (for insured lawyers only) while Texas,
with its traditionalistic/individualistic culture, has not acted to protect the public
from uninsured lawyers. Indeed, most of the traditionalistic and traditionalistic/
individualistic southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee) 530 do not
have any type of insurance disclosure requirement.5 31
At the same time, it is unclear whether the method of judicial selection affects
states' willingness to adopt laws that protect the public from uninsured lawyers. In
the two states that currently offer the least protection from uninsured lawyersTexas and New Jersey-the methods of judicial selection are very different.532 In
Texas, there are partisan elections and judges are highly dependent on lawyer contributions. In New Jersey, justices are appointed, and after their second term, they
may remain in office until retirement age. In two states with non-partisan judicial
elections, insurance is required (Idaho and Oregon) while in the three other states
with non-partisan or retention elections (California, Nevada, and Washington), it
is not. Closer analysis of judicial politics in these and other states may reveal that
methods of judicial selection make a difference on this issue, but such differences
were not apparent in this study.
It does not appear, however, that certain types of state legislatures are more
likely to regulate the legal profession to protect the public from uninsured

528. See supra note 347 and accompanying text: Telephone interview with Michelle Points, supranote 245;
Petition of the State Bar of Nevada, ADKT 534, supra note 27, at 7.
529. See Order Denying Petition for Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 79, supra note 401. The State Bar
website does not advise the public that this information is available.
530. Morgan & Watson, supra note 189, at 43.
531. Only Virginia (traditionalistic) and West Virginia (traditionalistic/individualistic) are exceptions. See
ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON
INSURANCE DISCLOSURE, supranote 137, at 5-6.

532. In 2019 fifteen years after the ABA adopted its Model Court Insurance Disclosure Rule the New
Jersey Supreme Court indicated it would require insured lawyers to disclose whether they carry insurance, but
seemingly is not requiring disclosure by uninsured lawyers. See Notice to the Bar Ad Hoc Committee on
Attorney Malpractice Insurance, supra note 453 and accompanying text. That requirement has yet to be
implemented.
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lawyers. 533 California is the only state studied with a full-time legislature and it
wields considerable power vis-a-vis the State Bar. Indeed, the California legislature adopted the first requirement that lawyers disclose to clients whether they
maintained LPL insurance, a dozen years before the ABA adopted its Model
Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure. But the three other states with the most professional legislatures (New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan)534 have not displayed similar interest in the insurance issue. Indeed, New York has no insurance
disclosure requirement, and while Michigan and Pennsylvania have disclosure
requirements, they were instituted by the state supreme courts.535
Finally, the case studies reflect that the public was largely absent from the decisionmaking over whether and how to regulate uninsured lawyers. This is true of
most lawyer regulation efforts. 536 In Oregon and Idaho, the State Bars recommended
mandatory insurance, even though there were no non-lawyer members involved in
the deliberations. Thus, mandatory insurance can be adopted without public involvement. Likewise, the Nevada Task Force and the Board of Governors that voted in
favor of mandatory insurance included no public members. The presence of a small
number of public members on decisionmaking bodies that considered the insurance
issue did not guarantee success. The Washington Task Force that voted in favor of
mandatory insurance included two lay members and one LLLT, but there were no
lay members on the Board of Governors that ultimately voted against it.537 There
was a single lay representative on the New Jersey Ad Hoc Committee that recommended against mandatory disclosure. 538 Likewise in Texas, where there was one
public member on the Task Force and six public members (out of forty) on the State
Bar Board, insurance disclosure was rejected. 539

533. Nor do the case studies suggest that a state legislature with statutory responsibilities to review the State
Bar's activities will promote significant public-regarding regulation. In recent years, the Texas legislature has
not focused attention on the issue of uninsured lawyers or other public protection measures commonly found in
other states. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N REPORT: STATE BY STATE
ADOPTION OF ABA CLIENT PROTECTION PROGRAMS (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/

administrative/professional _responsibility/state _bystatecpprograms.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5H3-YMR7]
(reflecting that Texas has not adopted most ABA-recommended client protection programs). It is possible that
a state with a full-time legislature, more frequent legislative reviews of the State Bar, and a less traditionalistic
political culture might adopt more public-regarding lawyer regulation.
534. See Full-and Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 114.
535. See Disciplinary Board Makes it Easy for Public to Know if Lawyers Have Professional Liability
Insurance, PA. Sup. CT. DISCIPLINARY BD. (May 10, 2017), https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/news-media/
news-article/3/di sciplinary-board-makes-it-easy-for-public-to-know-if-lawyers-have-professional-liability-insurance
[https://perma.cc/TTR3-DLWP]; Mich. Sup. Ct., Administrative Order No. 2003-5 (Aug. 6, 2003).
536. For example, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, which drafted revisions in the Model Rules, was
composed entirely of lawyers and judges. See About Us, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_ responsibility/committees_commissions/aba-commission-on-ethics-20-20/aboutus/ [https://
perma.cc/LM3Q-URKS] (last visited May 26, 2020).
537. See supra note 345 and accompanying text. It was only after the WSBA Board of Governors rejected
the mandatory insurance proposal that Equal Justice Washington formed and proposed a rule change.
538. See supra note 435 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 473, 484 and accompanying text.
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The public was also largely absent from the debate over this issue. In Washington,
one member of the public spoke in favor of an insurance requirement in the public
hearing before the Board of Governors,54 but his views were outweighed by many
lawyers who spoke out in opposition to mandatory insurance. He was able to resurrect the issue after the WSBA rejected it, but whether he will achieve a rule change
remains unclear. Two consumer-oriented organizations wrote the Texas Supreme
Court supporting disclosure requirements, to no avail. In New Jersey, the Supreme
Court invited lawyers to comment on the Ad Hoc Committee's report, but did not
invite public comment. The Nevada Supreme Court invited public comment on the
Task Force's recommendation, but it published its order only where lawyers would
see it, and received no comments from the public.541 Public choice theory suggests
the initiatives in other states would have been more successful if there were more
public involvement in the process, but it is very difficult to know.54 2
CONCLUSION

What does the case of LPL insurance reveal more generally about the politics
of lawyer regulation? At least on certain issues, state supreme courts will wait for
the organized bar to bring issues concerning lawyer regulation to their attention.
Some-but not all-courts will accede to the recommendations of the bar.54 3 Bar
leadership, the internal decisionmaking of bar organizations, and the process for
considering new lawyer regulation can affect the outcomes. Of course, the likelihood of adopting public-regarding lawyer regulation may depend upon the states'
political culture. Additional interest groups may also affect the results.
Further research is needed to explore the politics of lawyer regulation to determine the conditions under which states will adopt public-regarding laws. 544 Does
the size of the bar, its homogeneity, type, or location affect whether lawyers will
support regulations that are not in their personal interest? Does the relative proximity of states make a difference? For example, why are Arizona, California,
Utah, and Washington the only states that permit non-lawyers to provide some
legal services or act as document preparers?54 5 Why are New York and New

540. See Public Session Minutes, WSBA Mandatory Malpractice Task Force Special Meeting (Apr. 22,
2019), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/about-wsba/governance/bog-meeting-minutes-2018-2019/
board-of-governors-special-public-session-minutes-april-22-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=855a0dfl_8
[https://perma.cc/
7D9V-6H97].
541. Order Scheduling Public Hearing and Requesting Public Comment, ADKT 534, supra note 397; see
also supra notes 398-99 and accompanying text.
542. The impact of public opinion and public engagement on political decisionmakers is highly contingent
on context. For a discussion of some of the research on this issue, see Anne Rasmussen et al., With a Little Help
from the People? The Role of PublicOpinion in Advocacy Success, 51 COMP. POL. STUD. 139, 140-47 (2018).
543. See also Zacharias, supranote 49, at 1174-75; Zacharias & Green, supranote 11, at 94.
544. Such laws might include measures to protect client trust accounts (e.g., random audits), to license nonlawyer legal services providers or to require lawyer disclosure of confidential information to protect the public.
545. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Arizona and California license document preparers. See
ARIz. CODE JUD. ADMIN. §§ 7-201, 7-208 (2019); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6400 (West 2019).

2020]

THE POLITICS OF LAWYER REGULATION

1033

Jersey the only states to impose discipline sanctions on law firms?5 4 6 Likewise,
how do judicial training and socialization influence judges' conception of judges'
roles with respect to regulating lawyers? How do organizations such as the
Conference of Chief Justices affect their views about appropriate regulation? Are
there ways to measure the relations between bench and bar (such as network analysis) that might help explain justices' decisions concerning lawyer regulation?
Do legislatures play a larger role in the adoption of public-regarding lawyer regulation than the case studies suggest? If so, when, why, and what role, if any, do
lawyer-legislators play in that process? When does media attention help produce
public-regarding law?5 4 7
The malpractice insurance example suggests that the public is largely dependent on the bar to pursue certain types of public-regarding lawyer regulation. The
courts rarely initiated study of the question of uninsured lawyers, and sometimes
considered it only reluctantly, when they were confronted by lawyers who raised
the issue in the legal press. Likewise, with the exception of California, state legislatures will not step in and address this issue. This is not just true with respect to
the states studied here; there has been no significant legislative initiative on this
issue anywhere else in the United States.
Thus, it is worth considering whether more can be done to focus public attention on the need for lawyer regulation that better protects the public. One way
might be to notify the public in some meaningful way of the issues at stake and
the opportunity for public comment. But interest group theory suggests that even
then, it will be difficult to mobilize the public to act. Consumers have diverse concerns, and uninsured lawyers present only one of many sources of problems for
the public. Many individuals use lawyers only occasionally (if ever) and have little incentive to devote time to advocacy on complicated issues concerning lawyer
regulation.
The challenge, then, is to find ways to inject greater consideration of the public
interest into debates about lawyer regulation when no one-except the bar-may
be paying close attention to the issues. One way to do so might be to appoint a
larger number of public members to sit on mandatory state bar governing boards
and state bar committees concerned with lawyer regulation. The California legislature has already done this by requiring, since 2013, that the State Bar Board of
Trustees include seven lawyers and six public members. 548 In states with voluntary state bars, courts should appoint several public members to court-constituted
committees that consider lawyer regulatory issues. Lay appointees should not be

546. See 22 NYCRR § 1240.2(j) (2019); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a), 5.3 (2019).
547. Media attention in Nevada and New Jersey may have contributed to the Supreme Courts' decisions in
those states to study the LPL insurance issue. It did not, however, seem to play a role in persuading the Courts
to adopt an insurance requirement or strong disclosure rules.
548. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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merely symbolic "friends of lawyers"; they should have consumer rights
orientations.

Alternatively, a public advocate might participate in the regulatory process,
representing the public's interests and presenting the public's views on issues
relating to lawyer regulation. Public advocates are sometimes used by states to
offset the effects of regulatory capture in agencies.5 4 9 Typically, public advocates
are state-funded and independent representatives empowered to intervene in certain administrative proceedings and to research and present the public's interests.550 In light of the seeming failure of most courts or legislators to propose
public-regarding lawyer regulation, public advocates should not be limited to
reacting to bar proposals, but should also be encouraged to propose lawyer regulation. Courts (and in some states, legislatures) can create the public advocate
positions and incorporate them into the processes that produce lawyer regulation.
Procedurally, this might be as simple as seeking comment from the public advocate after a state bar or court-appointed committee has made a recommendation
to the court.
As Rachel Barkow notes, the selection process for public advocates is "critically important" and should not be dominated by the regulated industry." 1
Public advocates should be selected who have a greater interest in consumer and
public welfare than in any particular industry.5 5 2 Steps must be taken to ensure
that the public advocate is not captured by the interests that are already represented in the political process (in this case, lawyers).5 5 3 One way to avoid capture
is to ensure that the position is adequately resourced.5 5 4 The biggest challenge
may be persuading courts of the need for a public advocate, as this requires them
to overrule likely bar objections. They would also need to admit (at least to themselves) that they are not sufficiently attending to the public interest when they regulate lawyers. More research on the politics of lawyer regulation may help them
reach that conclusion.

549. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Reforming Regulation: Policies to Counteract Capture and Improve the
Regulatory Process, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
economy/reports/2016/11/01/291499/reforming-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/752M-3M9Z]; Elizabeth Warren,
Corporate Capture of the Rulemaking Process, REGULATORY REV. (June 14, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/
2016/06/14/warren-corporate-capture-of-the-rulemaking-process/ [https://perma.cc/H5A6-DZRB].
550. See, e.g., Alan M. White, Banks as Utilities, 90 TuL. L. REv. 1241, 1283 (2016) (discussing public
advocates in the context of utility rate increase requests).
551. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L.
REv. 15,63 (2010).
552. Id.
553. See Neil Komesar & Wendy Wagner, The Administrative Process from the Bottom Up: Reflections on
the Role, If Any, for Judicial Review, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 891, 946 (2017).
554. Id.; Barkow, supra note 551, at 63.

